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INTRODUCTION
The enactment of the National Labor Relations Act' ("NLRA") in
1935 was an economic and social watershed. The NLRA was the
successor to section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act2
("NIRA"), the initial experiment in American corporatist governance.'
The NLRA gave the United States a radically new labor policy, one
dramatically more effective in facilitating union organization than its
immediate predecessor. Following the path identified by the predecessor
NIRA, which had contemplated a network of industry "codes," labor
relations under the NLRA have developed in significant part along
industry lines.' And until the mid-i 960s, the NLRA itself generated a set
of labor relations which, because they were a compound of union,
industry, and government input, could accurately be described as an
American version of postwar European neocorporatist approaches to
labor/management relations.5 Because organized labor's role in the
national economy has steadily diminished, however, the results of
collective bargaining no longer merit close government oversight. In this
Article, the labor policy of the NLRA is evaluated comparatively in the
1. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994 &
Supp. 1 1995)). On the origins of the Wagner Act, see Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of
the Wagner Act. Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379 (1993), and
Thomas J. Campbell, Labor Lav and Economics, 38 STAN. L. REv. 991, 995-98 (1986).
2. Ch. 90,48 Stat. 195, 198-99 (1933) (repealed by Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554,
§ 8, 80 Stat. 648). The NIRA was declared unconstitutional in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-51 (1935).
3. See DONALD R. BRAND, CORPORATISM AND THE RULE OF LAW: A STUDY OF THE
NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 81-91 (1988). Corporatism is a label widely applied to a
system in which issues of social concern are resolved through interest group bargaining carried on
under the supervision of the state but outside of the normal legislative process. See CHARLES S.
MAiER, RECASTING BOURGEOIS EUROPE 9-10, 353-54, 582 (1975); see also Philippe C. Schmitter,
Still the Century of Corporatism?, 36 REv. POL. 85, 86-93 (1974) (defining the term "corporatism"
to produce a more utilitarian definition). The NIRA followed the corporatist model by authorizing
each industry to work out for itself a "code or codes of fair competition" which would be effective
upon Presidential approval. National Industrial Recovery Act § 3(a). Brad believes that the NIRA
and its administering agency, the National Recovery Administration, produced an emergent societal
corporatism. See BRAND, supra, at 19.
4. See Michael J. Heilman, Comment, The National Labor Relations Act at Fifty: Roots
Revisited, Heart Rediscovered, 23 DUQ. L. REv. 1059, 1068-71 (1985).
5. Melvyn Dubofsky describes government during the Eisenhower period as actively fostering
cooperation between big business and big labor through a "politics of productivity" in which class
conflicts over redistribution were transformed into a shared focus on improving economic
performance. See MELVYN DuBOFsKY, THE STATE AND LABOR IN MODERN AMERICA 210 (1994).
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light of the alternative labor policies followed in parts of Europe and in
Japan.
The NLRA was crafted to meet the economic and political agenda
of President Franklin Roosevelt's "New Deal." The NLRA was overtly
designed, inter alia, to reduce labor unrest, to enhance the bargaining
power of labor unions, and to facilitate a redistribution of income to the
working classes. Many of the Act's underlying assumptions are no
longer valid. The disparate bargaining power which the Act is designed
to remedy was exacerbated in the 1930s by an oversupply of labor-
unemployment in 1935 ran at approximately twenty percent of the
civilian labor force.7 Congress believed that the Great Depression had
been caused by inadequate spending. One of the assumptions underlying
the NLRA was that, by aiding the organization of unions, the Act would
divert income from the wealthier classes who saved to the working
classes who spent proportionately more of their income on consumption.
Congress also assumed that the markets in which goods were produced
and sold were primarily domestic. Finally, Congress was not concerned
with the integration of women, minorities, and immigrants into the
workforce at the time that it enacted the NLRA' Despite the vast
6. This redistributive objective appears in the legislative findings contained in section 1 of
the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994) (stating "[the inequality of bargaining power... tends to
aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of
wage earners ... ."). Senator Wagner asserted in the Senate that during the 1920s increases in
productivity had vastly outdistanced wage increases on the order of nine to one. See 79 CONG. REC.
S7567 (1935). Senator Wagner argued that redistribution of income from capital to labor would raise
overall demand, because of the higher propensity to consume in the working classes. See id. at
S7567-68; 78 CONG. REC. S12,018 (1934); see also S. REP. No. 74-573, at 3-4 (1935) (presenting
the Senate Committee on Education and Labor's findings on what would become the NLRA); 78
CONG. REC. H9060-61 (1934) (statements of Rep. Carpenter); ARTHuR SCHLESINGER JR., THE
COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 123 (1959) (discussing New Deal proposals of price-fixing to stabilize
the economy); Richard A. Epstein, A Common Lawfor Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal
Labor Legislation, 92 YALE LJ. 1357, 1380-82 (1983) (noting that judges were unwilling "to
address systemic economic issues," leaving such issues to be dealt with in the debates over the New
Deal legislation).
7. In 1935 unemployment was 10,610,000 while the civilian labor force was 52,870,000. See
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISnCAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 175 tbl.209 (71st ed.
1950).
8. Indeed, when Congress enacted the NLRA, it exacerbated the problem of blacks and other
racial minorities. The NLRA (like the NIRA before it) established a system in which a majority of
workers could select an exclusive bargaining representative. Moreover, the NLRA permitted closed
shop agreements, i.e., agreements under which an employer would hire only union members. At that
time, many labor unions, especially those affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, excluded
racial minorities from membership. The result was that the NLRA created a system in which racial
minorities would be unrepresented in collective bargaining and would be forced out of their jobs
when a closed shop was negotiated. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored
[Vol. 26:85
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economic and social changes which have occurred in this nation during
the last sixty years, the labor policy formulated in the NLRA has
remained in force, essentially unchanged.
The NLRA initially intensified labor unrest,9 but it was an unrest
which accompanied, in the eyes of many New Dealers, a reformulation
of the social contract, broadening the participation of the working classes
in the economic fruits of capitalism." That unrest reached its zenith in
the spring of 1937 when automobile workers seized General Motors
production plants in Flint, Michigan." That seizure and the decision of
then Governor (later U.S. Supreme Court Justice) Frank Murphy not to
use force to retake the plants brought about the capitulation of most of
the auto and steel industries to union demands for recognition. These
union successes culminated an organizing drive in mass-production
industries overseen by the new Committee for Industrial Organization
(later to become the independent Congress of Industrial Organization
("CIO")), an association of American Federation of Labor ("AFL")
dissidents who viewed AFL organizing efforts in the mass-production
industries as inadequate. 2 Most U.S. mass-production industries were
People and the Urban League anticipated these problems and lobbied unsuccessfully for changes in
the NLRA to protect racial minorities. See HERBERT HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERiCAN
LEGAL SYSTEM 101 (1977).
Almost three decades passed from the enactment of the NLRA to the enactment of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2002 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995)), where Congress addressed the problem of integrating
women and racial and ethnic minorities into the work force.
9. Following the enactment of the NLRA a strike wave occurred in 1936-1937. See
DUBOFSKY, supra note 5, at 201. That wave of strikes included sit down strikes at General Motors
and other firms. See id. at 138-42, 163.
10. Professor Dubofsky refers to a "constitutional revolution" which made its formal
appearance in the Supreme Court decision upholding the Wagner Act. See DUBOFSKY, supra note
5, at 145 (commenting on NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)). That,
however, was the outward form of the revolution. Underlying the constitutional revolution were the
mandate of the 1936 election, Roosevelt's Court-packing plan, and the spread of industrial warfare.
See id. These several factors supporting the constitutional revolution, together with the revamped
constitutional doctrine, produced a supporting social revolution, one in which the level of economic
participation of the working class was enhanced. See John Batt, American Legal Populism: A
Jurisprudential and Historical Narrative, Including Reflections on Critical Legal Studies, 22 N. KY.
L. REV. 651, 715 (1995); see also Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of
Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 753, 944
(1994) (describing the social and economic context of the late 1930s and early 1940s). Barenberg
is quoted infra note 13.
11. See DUBOFSKY, supra note 5, at 138-42.
12. The Committee for Industrial Organization was established in November 1935, largely
through the efforts of United Mine Workers' President John L. Lewis. See id. at 133. As noted in
the text, its goal was the unionization of mass-production industries. Subsequently, the Committee
1997]
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organized within the next five years. 3 After the initial period of turmoil,
most major manufacturing companies accepted unionization. The model
of labor relations in which a large industrial union representing all or
most workers in an industry bargains with several employers in an
oligopolistically structured industry became a common feature of
American labor relations. 4
Through most of the 1950s, the labor union movement flowered.
During that period, labor unions were widely perceived as an essential
part of a society which aspired to liberal and democratic values. The
proponents of the NLRA saw labor unions as a means for redirecting
income streams from capital to labor, a result justified both normatively
and pragmatically. They believed that this redistribution not only
produced a more just social result, but that by increasing income in the
hands of the working classes (who possessed a higher propensity to
spend than did the entrepreneurial classes), this redistribution also helped
to sustain overall demand for goods and services.s The enactment in
1947 of the Taft-Hartley Act 6 can be seen in retrospect as an effective
formal recognition and acceptance by political conservatives of labor's
successes in organizing much of manufacturing, communications, and
transportation during the preceding decade. 7 Indeed, in the immediate
postwar period, the U.S. government--seeing American labor policy as
for Industrial Organization formally split from the AFL to become the independent CIO. The CIO
and the AFL merged in 1955. See id. at 133, 152, 208.
13. The particular economic and social conditions which supported union orgasizing efforts
during the late 1930s and early 1940s have been succinctly summarized by Mark Barenberg:
That era was marked by grinding labor conditions and poverty; workers' experience or
recent memory of economic desperation and felt betrayal by employers in the aftermath
of the Great Depression; the homogenization of mass production workforces; a general
cultural milieu still in transition from "producerist" and work-ethic values to
"consumerist" and hedonic norms; volcanic labor unrest and populist political
movements; lower levels of product-market competition and capital mobility than today;
a rising, progressive political-intellectual elite that was zealously committed to building
a labor-corporatist society and that controlled decisive levers of state power, and the
crucial clinching effect of a superheated labor market caused by state mobilization for all-
out war.
Barenberg, supra note 10, at 944.
14. For an economic analysis of how the bargaining context is altered by the industrial
structure of the product market level, see Daniel J. Gifford, Redefining the Antitrust Labor
Exemption, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1379, 1399-1404 (1988).
15. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
16. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1994 & Supp. 1997)).
17. On the organization of the communications industry during the 1940s, see JOHN N.
SCmHACT, THE MAKING OF TELEPHONE UNIONISM 1920-1947, at 130-81 (1985).
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a triumph of democratic over reactionary values-sought to export the
American model of labor policy to a recovering Europe in need of stable
social institutions. 8
Today the labor policy of the NLRA is widely perceived as in need
of reform. This perceived need for reform is reflected, inter alia, in
President Clinton's appointment of the Dunlop Commission to study the
labor laws and to make recommendations for their reform.'9 The
Commission indicated its support for quality circles and other forms of
employee involvement in the production process. Accordingly, the
Commission recommended that Congress clarify section 8(a)(2) of the
NLRA to eliminate uncertainty over the lawfulness of these forms of
employee involvement."0 Unfortunately, however, the Dunlop Commis-
sion took the politically expedient route of failing to reassess the
adversary model on which present American labor relations are founded.
The Commission avoided any comparative consideration of the industry-
specific labor union model common to the United States and Canada
with the alternative labor structures found in Europe and Japan. A wide
array of critics, however, assert the need for labor law reform, although
they differ sharply about the direction of reform. Labor union sympa-
thizers-such as William Gould, the present Chair of the NLRB-call for
legislation to strengthen the power of labor unions." One of their
principal goals is legislation forbidding employers to hire permanent
replacements for strikers, an employer prerogative recognized since
18. See Charles S. Maier, The Politics of Productivity: Foundations ofAmerican International
Economic Policy After World War 17, 31 INT'L. ORG. 607 (1977).
19. See Fact Finding Report Issued by the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management
Relations, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 105, at S-4 (Special Supp. June 2, 1994) [hereinafter Fact
Finding Report].
20. See id. at S-34. The lawfulness of quality circles and other forms of employee participation
in production decisions was brought into question as a result of the logical ramifications of recent
NLRB decisions. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 896-97 (1993);
Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.RB. 990,997-98 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994). Under
the rationale of these decisions, groups of employees who participate with a management
representative in making production decisions are vulnerable to being characterized as an employer
dominated labor union and thus as an unfair labor practice under the NLRA. On July 30, 1996,
President Clinton vetoed the Teamwork for Employees and Management Act (S. 295), a bill which
would have authorized the establishment of cooperative workplace arrangements, such as quality
circles. See President's Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the
Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1995, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. DOC. 1378-79 (July
30, 1996) [hereinafter President's Message]; see also S. REP. No. 104-259, at 3 (1996) (summarizing
arguments favoring the bill).
21. See WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM 261 (1993).
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1938.' These critics contend that although employers have held the
legal right to replace strikers for almost sixty years, few employers had
exercised that right until the 1980s, when President Reagan's dismissal
and replacement of striking air controllers removed employer inhibitions
on the hiring of replacements.' These critics argue that the mere power
to replace strikers has strengthened the hand of employers in bargaining.
By contrast, employer groups have focused their criticisms of the Act on
ways in which it has impeded efforts to improve workplace efficiency or
fostered inefficiency, especially on its threat to quality circles and other
forms of worker participation in improving the production process.24
Nonpartisan critics also have proposals for reform.'
Labor union membership has declined both relative to the workforce
and in absolute numbers.26 Labor unions are no longer widely viewed
as mechanisms for bringing about more just social relations. Indeed,
labor unions are widely viewed as another interest group, actively
engaged in rent-seeking. Consumers have become increasingly conscious
that prices have been inflated with labor rents in industries with strong
unions and no foreign competition. Scholars have pointed out how
22. See id. at 184-85; see also PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 264-69 (1990)
(characterizing the ability of employer's to hire replacement workers during a strike as a "serious
imbalance"). The legal right of employers to hire replacements has been recognized since the
Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph, Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). For
a thoughtful analysis of the Mackay issue which differs from the conclusions of Gould and Weiler,
see Samuel Estreicher, Collective Bargaining or "Collective Begging"?: Reflections on
Antistrikebreaker Legislation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 577, 580-82 (1994).
23. See GOULD, supra note 21, at 185. Until President Reagan's actions in the Professional Air
Traffic Controllers Organization ("PATCO") strike, employers had not made frequent use of their
right under the NLRA to replace striking workers. The PATCO strike and its aftermath are described,
inter alla, in Schapansky v. Department of Transportation, 735 F.2d 477, 479-81, 486-87 (Fed. Cir.
1984). For an example of interesting labor law issues connected with the practice of striker
replacements, see NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 786-93 (1990) (analyzing
and affirming the NLRB's rejection of the presumption that striker replacements are necessarily anti-
union).
24. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Reform: Opening Up
the Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 827 (1996) (arguing for a greater
freedom of contract between unions and management); Charles J. Morris, A Blueprint for Reform
of the National Labor Relations Act, 8 ADM. L.L AM. U. 517 (1994) (arguing for the amendment,
rather than the replacement, of the NLRA and its enforcement procedures). Professor Weiler would
reform the NLRA to make provision for new forms of employee involvement with a hope that
ultimately a form of enterprise unionism develops. See WEiLER, supra note 22, at 222-24.
26. In 1953 approximately 37 percent of the private-sector work force was unionized. See
Barenberg, supra note 10, at 758. In 1995, that figure was 10.3 percent. See U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNrrED STATES 436 tbl.681 (116th ed. 1996)
[hereinafter 1996 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
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particularly powerful unions, like the United Automobile Workers, have
imposed differentially high costs upon their industries, disadvantaging
those industries in competition with foreign rivals and reducing
employment in their industries.'
Labor unions have increasingly come to symbolize reactionary,
rather than liberal, causes. Since 1967 organized labor has abandoned its
previous support for free trade and opted for protectionism. Organized
labor vigorously opposed the adoption of the North American Free Trade
Agreement and the revision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade under the new World Trade Organization Agreement.'s In its
advocacy of protectionist policies, organized labor further visibly
emphasizes its active rent-seeking. Worse, labor unions have come to be
perceived as barriers to the full absorption of minorities and the
underprivileged into the economic mainstream. Although labor union
rhetoric has often drawn from the ideology of working class solidarity,
labor union behavior has often been exclusionary in fact.29 Thus labor
practices which had arisen in struggles with employers did not easily
accommodate the relatively sudden and large scale changes in hiring
practices which the civil rights movement sought. Labor unions had
entrenched the practice of seniority, a practice which made new hires the
first to be laid off.3" Craft unions had erected elaborate skill barriers to
entry, and they often restricted entry still further through numerical
quotas.31 These and other practices have brought them into open conflict
27. See JUNICHI GOTO, LABORIN INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY 61-62,130 (1990); Gifford,
supra note 14, at 1423-25.
28. See Roy J. Adams & Parbudyal Singh, Early Experience with NAFTA 's Labour Side
Accord, 18 CoMP. LAB. L.. 161, 161 (1997); Edmund W. Sim, Derailing the Fast-Track for
International Trade Agreements, 5 FLA. INT'L Li. 471, 488 (1990).
29. See MILTON FREDMAN, CAPIrrALISM AND FREEDOM 124 (1962) ("[Unions] have also made
the incomes of the working class more unequal by reducing the opportunities available to the most
disadvantaged workers."); see also Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 774
(1952) (finding a union had used its "power to destroy colored workers' jobs in order to bestow
them on white workers"); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S.
210, 211 (1944) (finding labor organiztions have "the duty to represent all the employees in the
craft without discrimination because of their race"); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S.
192, 204 (1944) (finding the union failed "to represent non-union or minority union members of the
craft without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith"); HILL, supra note 8, at
101 (commenting that neither the NLRA nor the Railway Labor Act explicitly protected minorities
from discrimination).
30. On seniority and its reinforcement in a labor union context, see RICHARD B. FREEMAN &
JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS Do? 122-35 (1984).
31. See Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 427.40
(1986) (describing a twenty-year patten of discrimination in which the petitioner-union "creat~ed]
impenetrable barrier[s] for nonwhite applicants").
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with civil rights organizations.
This Article explores the kinds of reforms which would help to
bring U.S. labor policy into a greater degree of harmony with current
economic and social conditions. These conditions include rapidly
diminishing barriers to international trade and the concomitant intensifi-
cation of global competition. They also include a domestic workforce
composed of a growing proportion of women, minorities, and immi-
grants. 2 This Article examines institutional arrangements which have
developed in the United States, Europe, and Japan for dealing with labor
issues and the incentives which these several institutional arrangements
generate.
In evaluating three collective bargaining models suggested by
experience in the United States, Europe, and Japan, this Article employs
organizational structure, economics, and public choice approaches. The
analysis of this Article draws from Mancur Olson's approach to private-
interest organizations,33 from Martin Weitzman's approach to profit
sharing,34 from Junichi Goto's approach to international trade,a5 and
from my own earlier work on the labor exemption from U.S. antitrust
law.36 This Article takes note of Olson's claim that the "encompassing"
labor unions of Germany and Scandinavia are more likely to engage in
public-regarding behavior than the less encompassing American
unions.37 This Article concludes, however, that the encompassing labor
union model is vulnerable to falling short of its theoretical potential. It
further concludes that the public-regarding behavior predicted for
encompassing labor unions can be generated by profit-sharing arrange-
ments modeled on Japanese practices. This is something of a paradox;
because labor unions in Japan are all enterprise (or "company") unions,
the Japanese labor union structure thus falling at the opposite end of the
organizational spectrum from the Olsonian and German/Scandinavian
encompassing model. Because of the small share of the American work
force represented by labor unions, and therefore the impracticality of
reform along the lines of an encompassing union structure, the Japanese
model is a more promising source of ideas and practices for the eventual
32. See Fact Finding Report, supra note 19, at S-12.
33. See MANCuR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) [hereinafter OLSON,
LOGIC]; MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982) [hereinafter OLSON, RISE AND
DECLINE].
34. See MARTIN L. NVEITZMA, THE SHARE ECONOMY (1984).
35. See GOTO, supra note 27.
36. See Gifford, supra note 14.
37. See OLSON, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 33, at 47-53.
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reform of U.S. labor laws and policies.
I. LABOR, GOVERNMENT, AND THE WAGE RATE
A. Recent Governmental Approaches
Although President Franklin Roosevelt's Administration encouraged
unionization as a means for redistributing income away from savers to
spenders thereby stimulating demand for goods and services,38 govern-
ment policies towards labor unions have, at least since the 1960s, been
influenced by very different concerns. During the 1960s and 1970s, the
concerns of the U.S. government were focused upon interactions between
wage rates and inflation. Government then sought means for holding
wage increases to increases in productivity. Successive governmental
attempts to achieve these objectives were embodied in the Kennedy-
Johnson wage-price guidelines, in the Nixon Phase I and Phase II
incomes policies, and in the Carter system of voluntary wage stan-
dards.39 During the last two decades, federal anti-inflationary policy has
moved out of the labor arena and now resides primarily in the Federal
Reserve Board and its decisions over monetary policy.'4 Today, a wide
variety of critics call for labor law reform. Yet there is no consensus on
the direction of that reform. This Article contends that a reexamination
of the premises underlying our current labor policy would reveal the
NLRA to be obsolete, and that the contemporary context of intense
global competition and domestic social needs almost dictate the direction
of reform.
In Europe, governments have sought to constrain union power in the
interest of protecting the competitive position of export industries, of
reducing unemployment, of restraining cost-push inflation,4" and of
38. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
39. See RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS 548-50
(2d ed. 1985) (discussing U.S. incomes policies).
40. See Jim Chen & Daniel J. Gifford, Law as Industrial Policy: Economic Analysis of Law
in a New Key, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 1315, 1354 (1995). Disciplined monetary policy will prevent
or cure inflation, but governments sometimes try to avoid harsh remedial measures by pressuring
unions to hold wage demands within limits of productivity increases. See also AssAR LINDBECK,
UNEMPLOYMENT AND MACROEcONOMICS 148 (1993) (describing the effects of a newly imposed
monetary discipline in Sweden); Chen & Gifford, supra, at 1354 (explaining the Kennedy
administration's use of wage/price guidelines and persuasion to keep wage increases within the limits
of productivity increases).
41. See LINDBECK, supra note 40, at 148.
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enhancing profits--thereby encouraging investment. The premise for all
of these governmental involvements is: (1) Unions pursue legitimate
objectives when they seek higher wages for their members; but (2) the
scope for higher wages consistent with national interest is limited by
productivity increases, international competitiveness, or a need to
decrease unemployment; and (3) in the absence of governmental
involvement, there is a danger that employers may accede to excessive
union demands. 2 A review of traditional labor union rhetoric as well as
of some elementary labor economics will be helpful to an understanding
of the problems facing government.
B. Distributional Fairness
Labor unions frequently employ the language and rhetoric of
distributional fairness and just wages to support wage demands. Because
there are no generally accepted standards of distributional fairness or just
wages, 3 this rhetoric is conceptually indeterminate. It is helpful,
42. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
43. John Rawls, perhaps our leading thinker on fairness, believes that "income and wages will
be just once a (workably) competitive price system is properly organized and embedded in a just
basic structure." JOHN RAiLS, A THEORY OF JusTcE 304 (1971). In addition to Rawls's specific
remarks about wages, his difference principle can also contribute in an indirect way to an analysis
of wage and other labor issues. Rawls's theory of justice--which he sometimes refers to as justice
as fairness--is built upon two objectively fair principles: (1) A liberty principle under which each
person is entitled to the maximum amount of liberty compatible with equal liberty for everyone else,
and (2) a difference principle, under which social and economic inequalities are justified only in so
far as they contribute to raising the level of well-being of the least advantaged class. See id. at 60.
Rawls has recently rearticulated his theory of justice, confining it to the political realm. Its newer
version, however, retains both principles. See JOHN RAwLs, POLrIcAL LIBERALISM 5-6 (1993).
Under the difference principle, society's institutions should be structured in such a way that
social and economic inequalities contribute to the betterment of the least advantaged class. Rawlsian
analysis suffers from indeterminacy problems similar to those afflicting the 'Just wage" rhetoric.
Thus, different individuals are apt to apply the difference principle differently, not only undermining
its usefulness as a guide but stimulating hostility and mistrust. See Daniel L Gifford, Interpersonal
Distrust in the Modified Rawlsian Society, 48 SMU L. REV. 217, 226 (1994); Daniel J. Gifford, The
Relevance of the Complexity of Social Arrangements to the Attainment of Rawlsian Justice, 51 TUL.
L. RFV. 510 (1977). Insofar as wages in a Rawlsian society would be determined by market mecha-
nisms, however, the objection of indeterminacy would not lie.
Although the difference principle does not furnish a substantive standard for evaluating
wages, it does provide a direction for assessing the institutions that determine them. Rawlsian
analysis appears hostile to institutional mechanisms which facilitate the capture by one group of
economic benefits which the free market would have allocated to less privileged others. Thus, it
appears that under a Rawlsian approach, productivity gains normally should be passed on to custom-
ers whenever the customer class includes persons economically less well off than the production
workers. Thus in this case (involving productivity gains) the direction indicated by the difference
principle coincides with Rawls's specific endorsement of marketplace determination of wages.
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however, to identify several underlying concepts of fairness to which
reference is commonly made in the framework of industrial relations.
First, the free-market wage level itself is often perceived as unfair.
This perception is reinforced by the differences in bargaining power
between large employers and individual workers." Second, rivalry
among employers to find sources of lower-wage labor is sometimes seen
as unfair. It is seen as unfair to the employees receiving the lower wages,
the preexisting higher wage being taken as the normative wage standard.
It is seen as unfair to the employer paying the higher wages because its
generosity is penalized in the product market when it is undercut by
rivals incurring lower wage costs. It is unfair to the employees receiving
the higher wages, because it threatens their jobs and/or their high wage
levels.45 The normative proposition invoked in these cases is that
competitive advantages in the product market should reflect only
production, marketing, and product-development efficiencies.' Third,
American industrial unions often contend that fairness requires that the
wage rate in an industry should capture some or all of productivity
advances. As far back as the immediate post-World War II period, the
Rawlsian objectives appear in the policies of the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions
(Landsorganisationen i Sverige or "LO'). The LO has pursued a "solidaristic" wage policy for many
years under which it has sought to restrain wage increases in the profitable Swedish export industries
in the interest of raising wages in the less profitable nontraded sectors where wages have been lower.
The goal of passing on gains in productivity to customers does not appear to be widely shared by
unions generally, however, and even the LO has deviated from that goal in practice. See Olle
Hammarstr6m, Swedish Industrial Relations, in INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS 187, 190, 204-05 (Greg J. Bamber & Russell D. Lansbury eds., 1987).
44. See Estreicher, supra note 25, at 829-30. This inequality of bargaining power, however,
should be assessed in the context of the market in which labor is sold. While employers'
unwillingness to bargain with individual workers over wages is sometimes construed as an
oppressive manifestation of unequal bargaining power, a large employer deals with many individuals,
each of whom is equally valuable to that employer. Thus, each worker should expect to be offered
precisely the same wage as the next.
45. Labor unions have been particularly vociferous in condemning competition among
employers in the labor market because it undercuts their negotiating power. In the period
immediately before and after World War II, the wage differential between the unionized textile mills
of the northeastern United States and the nonunion textile mills of the southeastern United States was
a source of discomfort to organized labor, as the southeastern mills constrained the bargaining power
of the textile unions over the northern mills. The current union objections to free trade are also
premised upon the view that competition between products made with union labor (or even with
nonunion labor paid at North American wage levels) and products made abroad with lower-paid
foreign workers is unfair. The unfairness results in both cases because of the differences in the wage
levels. The normative proposition invoked in these cases is that competitive advantages gained in
the product market from lower wages are unfair. Employers, it is said, ought to restrict their compe-
tition to efficiency in production, marketing and product development.
46. See Estreicher, supra note 22, at 598.
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United Auto Workers ("UAW") succeeded in persuading the automobile
manufacturers to recognize this norm.47 The 1948 agreement between
the UAW and General Motors provided for automatic annual wage
increases geared to assumed advances in productivity; the UAW obtained
similar agreements from the other automobile manufacturers and most of
the automotive parts industry in 1950.48 In Scandinavia, the powerful
metalworkers' unions of Sweden and Norway have embraced the Aukrust
model of wage determination, one that uses productivity advances for
wage increases. 9
In the twentieth century, the publics of most industrial nations came
to accept the view that the wage set by the market in the absence of
labor unions was likely to be unfairly low. This view is manifested in the
minimum wage laws. It is also reflected in legislation guaranteeing
workers rights to organize and to bargain collectively. Indeed, as
previously noted, Congress saw the NLRA, which provided such a
guarantee to American workers, as a device for raising wages." And at
least in the past, the publics of many nations believed that workers in
profitable industries ought to share in their employers' success.
Because there are no objective standards of fairness, disinterested
observers have no way of evaluating the merits of union wage claims.
Within most modem societies, however, unions operate in a political
context which is broadly supportive procedurally. Modem legal systems
generally recognize rights of workers to organize and to bargain
47. See Price Policy and Public Responsibility: Hearings on Administered Prices in the
Automobile Industry Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 85th Cong. 38 (1958) (statement of Walter P. Reuther, President, United Automobile,
Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America).
48. See id.
49. See Odd Aukrust, Inflation in the Open Economy: A Norwegian Model, in WORLDWIDE
INFLATION 107, 113-14 (Lawrence B. Krause & Walter S. Salant, eds. 1977). The Aukrust model
was adapted for Sweden in the so-called EFO model, named for G6sta Edgren, Karl-Olof Faxdn, and
Clas-Erik Odhner who so adapted it. See generally GOSTA EDGREN ET AL., WAGE FORMATION AND
THE ECONOMY (1973) (formulating an incomes policy for the long-term distribution of income in
Sweden). The model assumes wage increases and postulates that export industries will resist
increases eroding their long-term profitability. This means that wage increases will be held to
productivity advances plus increases in the world-market prices for the exported products. The
Aukrust/EFO model best fits a fixed exchange-rate system. See infra notes 89, 198 and
accompanying text.
50. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. The view that a free labor market is likely to
produce an unfair wage assumes that there are objective standards for determining when a wage is
unfairly low. That view draws upon various moral discourses which speak about a "fair" or 'Just"
wage. Generally these moral traditions arrive at their conclusions from the perspective of workers'
basic needs for food and housing. Accordingly, above the subsistence levels, they provide little
assistance in determining whether any particular wage is "fair" or 'Just."
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collectively with their employers. That legal recognition has sometimes
been reinforced when significant segments of the public have viewed
organized labor as providing a form of countervailing power vis-d-vis
powerful enterprises-a checking device helpful to the fluctuating
equilibrium of a democratic society. Modem societies thus tend to be
pragmatic in their approach to fairness. They largely regard wage levels
as properly subject to determination through a process of individual or
collective bargaining between employers and employees, where the result
depends upon the relative strengths of the parties. The prevailing norms
deal with the process of negotiation and bargaining rather than with the
substantive result. Such an approach accords well with the lack of any
generally accepted standard of fairness governing wages. It also avoids
direct government involvement in the process of wage determination and
so enables government to avoid responsibility for the results. Distancing
government from the determination of the wage rate keeps the process
nonpolitical and contributes to political stability.
The process does, however, expose the public to the ramifications
of the bargains reached between unions and employers. These agreements
in which bargainers find common ground may not always be advanta-
geous to the public. But because the bargainers have deep stakes in the
resulting agreement, while its negative effects are diffused throughout the
broad economy (and are obscured by the complex economic and financial
language in which the agreements are described and by the fairness
rhetoric which often permeates those descriptions), the latent public
interest in the results of the bargaining process is broadly under-
appreciated and is rarely asserted by governments in an effective manner.
I. SOME LABOR ECONOMICS AND RELATED MATTERS
A. The Wage Rate Equals the Value of the
Marginal Product of Labor
Economic theory teaches that workers will be hired so long as the
value of the marginal product of labor (i.e., the value produced by the
last worker hired) exceeds the wage rate. When the value of the marginal
product of labor falls to the wage rate, then no further workers will be
hired. But when the labor market operates freely, unemployed workers
will bid the wage rate down until the value of the marginal product of
labor equals the wage rate at full employment. This, of course, is a
simplified description, because what I have referred to as the wage rate
is shorthand for a complex array of wages reflecting a host of talents and
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skills and competencies. So understood, however, the theory indicates
that wages will adjust to reflect the demand for various kinds of skilled
and unskilled labor and to absorb all workers into the employed work
force. And at this level, each worker will be paid the value of his or her
contribution to production."
Corollaries of the assertion that an employer will hire workers until
the value of the marginal product of labor equals the wage are: (1) that
wage costs are a component in total production costs, (2) that they are
variable costs, and (3) that the number of workers hired bears an inverse
relationship to the wage rate. As the wage rate is an important compo-
nent in the variable cost structure of most industries, it is important to
examine the forces which help to determine the wage rate.
B. The Demand for Labor
1. As Affected by Industry Structure
Since labor is an input into the production process, it is the demand
of an employer's customers for the final product that ultimately
determines the demand of that employer for labor. The value of labor to
an employer thus is the value added by labor to raw materials and other
input, and that value is the difference between the sales price and the
nonlabor input. As noted above, employers will hire workers so long as
the value of the product produced by the last worker hired exceeds the
51. This theoretical result fails to hold in certain circumstances. When there is only one
employer in a community (or even when there are a small number of employers in a given
community) the employer is a monopsonistic buyer of labor, possessing power to choose the point
on the labor supply curve which maximizes the employer's welfare, a point different from the point
at which the wage rate equals the value of the marginal product of labor. Thus, by hiring fewer
workers, an employer forfeits the value which would otherwise be produced by the marginal workers
which it did not hire, but it trades off that value against the reduction in labor costs which it
achieved by driving down the wage for its entire work force. Employers with monopsonistic or
oligopsonistic power in the labor market would find the exercise of such power increasingly
beneficial as their work forces increased in size. Again, oligopsonistic cooperation among employers
would prove most effective in industries in which each employer employs large numbers of
undifferentiated (i.e., unskilled) workers. In such circumstances, each employer would incur the
maximum benefit from restricting its hiring in the manner described and the cooperation of each
employer would be facilitated, because the oligopsonistically-set wage would be highly visible. Steel
and other traditional mass-production industries in the early twentieth century employed large
numbers of unskilled workers. Were these industries to be concentrated geographically, they might
have exercised monopsonistic power in a local or regional labor market. When employers set the
wage rate monopsonistically or oligopsonistically, the wage rate will be below the value of the
marginal product of labor. For a general discussion on the interaction between wage rate and market
demand, see EHRENBERG & SMrrt, supra note 39, at 22-35.
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AC is the demand for the industry product. The vertical distance between AC and BD
represents the cost of nonlabor inputs into production. The curve BD is constructed by
subtracting the cost of nonlabor inputs from the demand for the industy's product (AC).
BD represents the industry's demand for labor, stated in terms of demand for labor per
unit of output. Multiplying BD by the number of units produced per worker gives the
industry's demand for labor, stated in wage-rate terms.
Because an employer's demand for labor is derivative of the demand
for goods produced with that labor, the demand for labor is affected by
several factors. First, the demand for labor in any particular industry is
affected by the structure of that industry. As the degree of concentration
in an industry increases, that industry is more likely to reflect
oligopolistic restraints on production. As an industry manifests such
production restraints, its demand for labor diminishes concomitantly from
what its demand would be were the industry acting competitively. Thus,
in a competitively structured industry, the demand for labor can be
derived directly from the demand for the product. In such an industry,
the demand for labor (stated in terms of labor cost per unit of output) can
be represented as the product demand less the cost of nonlabor inputs.52
The demand per unit of output can be transformed into an hourly wage
by multiplying the per-unit-of-output amount by labor productivity per
hour.
In a monopolistic or oligopolistic industry, however, the demand for
labor is derivative of the industry's marginal revenue curve. In such an
industry, the representation of the demand for labor (stated in terms of
labor cost per unit of output) now becomes the marginal revenue curve
52. See supra fig.l.
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less the cost of nonlabor inputs.53 As before, the demand per unit of
output can be transformed into an hourly wage by multiplying the per-
unit-of-output amount by labor productivity per hour. In an industry
bearing monopolistic characteristics, producers limit output to the amount
indicated by the intersection of their marginal revenue and marginal cost
curves. Thus the marginal cost curve less nonlabor inputs indicates the
amounts which a producer would be willing to spend on labor. Note that
at any point on the labor demand curve, so constructed, the labor cost
plus the cost of nonlabor inputs equals the producer's marginal cost




AC is the demand for the industry product. AF is the marginal revenue curve of the
industry monopolist. The vertical distance between BE and AF represents the cost of
nonlabor inputs. The curve BE is constructed by subtracting the cost of nonlabor inputs
from the monopolist's marginal curve (AF). BE represents the monopolist's demand for
labor, stated in terms of labor demand per unit of output. Multiplying BE by the number
of units produced per worker gives the labor demand stated in wage-rate terms.
2. As Affected by Union Organization
The degree and structure of union organization also affects the
demand for labor. In the textbook case of a completely free labor market,
the demand for unskilled labor is derivative of the aggregate demand for
all goods and services. And the supply of such labor consists of all
unskilled people in the labor force. Within each industry, employment is
determined by the intersection of the demand for labor within that
industry with the economy-wide wage rate. The presence of unions alters
this analytical picture. A union which organizes the workers of all of the
53. See infra fig.2.
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employers in a particular industry obtains a monopoly upon the supply
of labor specific to that industry. As a result, the economy-wide wage
rate is no longer relevant. Now the union attempts to use its labor
monopoly to bargain about raising the level at which the industry wage
rate will be set.
In a competitively structured industry which has been only partially
organized by a labor union, the product market provides a substantial
constraint upon the power of the union to exact concessions from
employers. The competitively set price in the product market determines
the value of the marginal product of labor. In such a partially organized
industry, employers cannot pass on any portion of a wage increase to
customers. To the extent that a union in such an industry is able to
pressure a given employer to raise wages above the preexisting level, the
production costs of that employer will increase and it will cut back on
the amount of the product produced. In more technical terms, that
employer's marginal cost curve will shift upwards and will intersect with
the competitive product price sooner. The employer will therefore
discharge workers at the margins, since the value of the marginal product
of those workers will no longer exceed their wages. This employer's
reduction in production, however, will be offset in the product market by
increased production from other companies with the lower customary
wage, and hence with lower marginal costs. The latter companies will
also increase their workforces at the margins, thus offsetting the loss of
jobs of the union workers with new jobs for nonunion workers.
Accordingly, competition in the product market exerts a constraining
effect upon a union's ability to extract concessions from an employer.
An industry whose labor force is entirely organized by a single
union, however, escapes this constraint. In that circumstance, the union
would attempt to bring about a standard industry wage structure so that
all employers were paying the same wage.54 Indeed, at that level of
generality, the union's objective is likely to be shared by all, or most,
employers. If all employers pay the same wage, then no employer has an
advantage in the product market as a result of paying lower wages.
Employers paying union wages would be anxious that their rivals would
also be paying union wages. From the union's perspective, when all
employers pay the same wage, then no employer is constrained by
54. For a discussion regarding unions attempting to take wages out of industry competition,
see Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product Markets, 69 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 3, 12-15 (1993).
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competition in the product market from acceding to union demands for
wage increases. A wage increase agreed to by all employers raises the
marginal cost curve of all employers simultaneously. No employer is
then disadvantaged vis-d-vis its rivals in the product market as a result
of acceding to a union demand for a wage increase.5
It is true that when the marginal cost curves of all companies in the
industry shift upwards, the industry supply curve will also shift upwards.
The result will be that the industry supply curve intersects sooner with
the demand curve for the industry's product, resulting in a higher product
price and a reduced amount of sales. There will, accordingly, be fewer
persons employed. Figure 3 illustrates the effect on prices, output, and
employment when a competitively structured industry is organized. The
result is that the industry behavior replicates a hypothetical monopolist
in order to produce labor rents. In the figure, the product price and
output under competitive labor conditions are 01 (price) and ON (output)
respectively. When a union with control over the industry labor supply
pressures wages upward, the product price is OP and the industry output
is OM. The resulting deadweight loss is equal to the area of a triangle
with a base of length MN and a height equal to PI.
When a monopolistic or oligopolistic industry is organized by an
industrial union, a similar effect is produced upon prices, output, and
employment, except that these effects are muted as the employer is
forced to absorb some of the effects on prices. Hence, output and
employment are not reduced as much as in the competitively structured
industry. Nonetheless, the union monopoly combines with the market
power of the employer to produce a combined restraint. The result not
only oppresses the public, but is also likely to be suboptimal for both
parties.56
55. This description applies to a domestic industry of an insulated economy, where there is no
significant competition from foreign producers. The description, therefore, roughly fits many U.S.
industries of the period prior to the mid 1970s. During the last two decades, competition from abroad
has generated constraints upon wage increases for domestic producers.
56. See Gifford, supra note 14, at 1402-03, 1414-17; infra note 58 (discussing off-the-labor-
demand-curve bargaining).
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AC represents the demand for the industry's product. The curve GL represents the
aggregate marginal costs of nonlabor inputs. The vertical distance GH represents labor
costs per unit of output in a competitive labor market. Thus, in a free labor market, the
industry would incur aggregate marginal costs of the amounts represented by GL plus
competitive labor costs in the amount GH. The aggregate marginal cost curve for the
industry, i.e., the industry's supply curve, accordingly, is the curve HK. Industry output
under such conditions would be ON and the price for the industry's product would be 01.
After the industry is organized, the union exerts upward pressure on the wage rate,
forcing labor costs to increase from GH to GI. The new industry supply curve then
becomes UJ, producing the lower output OM and the higher price OP.
C. The Objectives of Organized Labor
How organized labor reacts to the wage/employment tradeoff is a
puzzle.57 The traditional approach of economic theory is to assume that
business firms optimize their price/volume tradeoffs on a criterion of
profit maximization (or loss minimization). Thus a firm with some
market power determines when to sacrifice some profit margin for
greater volume, or vice versa, by choosing the combination of volume
and profit margin which it expects to produce the greatest profits. But
labor unions have no analogous function to maximize. They want higher
wages for their members, but they have no standard for dealing with the
wage/employment tradeoff.58 Perhaps labor unions want to maximize the
57. See ALBERT REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 47-53 (3d ed. 1989); see also
OLSON, LOGIC, supra note 33, at 39 n.59 (noting there is uncertainty about what it is that labor
unions maximize).
58. In traditional labor analysis, the union bargains with the employer about the wage rate,
implicitly accepting the tradeoff between the wage rate and employment indicated by the employer's
demand for labor. After the employer-union bargaining determines the wage rate, the employer then
determines how many workers will be hired at that wage rate. A difficulty with the traditional
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overall return to labor, i.e., the combination of wages and employment
which will produce the greatest sum of aggregate wages. Maximizing the
overall return to labor as a norm for labor union behavior would serve
working class interests as well as maximizing profits serve the interests
of stockholders. Yet there are reasons why such a criterion would be
analysis arises from the fact that wage-level bargaining necessarily involves the union in trading off
employment for increases in the wage level and vice versa. Thus, at least in theory, a union
possesses a utility function incorporating the relative weights it places on wage levels and
employment in these tradeoffs. Such a utility function could be represented in a series of indifference
curves, each of which expresses the union's indifference to different combinations of wage levels









In figure 4, the curve DD is the demand for labor. The indifference curves uO, ul, u2, and
u3, symbolize various levels of utility for the union, u3 reflecting a higher level of utility than u2
which reflects a higher level of utility than ul, which, in turn reflects a higher level of utility than
uO. The curves Il and 12 are isoprofit curves, reflecting the various combinations of wage rates and
employment levels which produce the same profit for the employer. All points on each isoprofit
curve produce the same profit, but the lower curves produce greater profits than the higher curves.
Thus the employer's profit at points on curve Il are greater than its profits on curve 12. Assume that
the employer and union agreed on a wage at the point where the union's indifference curve (ul) was
tangent to the labor demand curve. The employer's profit at that point is given by its isoprofit curve
(12). This, however, is not a Pareto result because the union could move up to indifference curve u2
without the employer being any worse off. Also, the employer could increase its profits to those
reflected by isoprofit curve I without the union being worse off. These off the labor demand curve
results are attainable if collective bargaining takes place over combinations of employment and
wages rather than just over wages. See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 39, at 406-10; BARRY T.
HIRSCH & JOHN T. ADDISON, THE ECONOmIC ANALYSIS OF UNIONS 14-18 (1986); Kenneth G. Dan-
Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis ofAmerican Labor Law and the Search for Bargaining Equity and
Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. L. REv. 419,434-40 (1992); see also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS
AND HIERARCIEs 89-90 (1975) (discussing bilateral monopoly negotiations). A model of labor
relations which made substantial use of profit-sharing or bonuses based upon the successes of the
employer in the product market would produce Pareto superior results. Such a model is discussed
infra Parts IV.C.2-3, V.C.
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incompatible with the structures of the industrial and craft unions of
North America.
Industrial unions share with craft unions an outlook which extends
primarily to the welfare of their own members, and this outlook is further
narrowed by two additional factors: (1) The membership of industrial
unions reflects current employment in their industries. Workers who are
laid off for extended periods drop off the rolls; (2) the wage/employment
tradeoff affects the membership differentially because of the seniority
system almost universally observed in North American employment.
Thus the benefit of wage increases accrues to workers with greater
seniority while the burdens of layoffs are borne by the workers with the
lesser seniority. While some wage/employment tradeoff is necessary in
the nature of collective bargaining, the internal dynamics of union
organization naturally skew the tradeoff towards the acceptance of more
(rather than fewer) layoffs. In the typical case, the great majority of
workers benefit (and these are the long-term union members), while those
who lose are fewer in number and by definition have been union
members for a shorter time. Yet the aggregate number of workers laid off
pursuant to wage/employment tradeoffs made over many years may be
a significant portion of the original employment base. Each time the
issue is approached, however, the adversely affected workers will be a
small number in proportion to the large numbers benefited.
Ill. THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN RELATION TO THE GOALS AND
ACTIVITIES OF ORGANIZED LABOR
The membership of all private-sector labor unions in the United
States was only slightly over ten percent of the labor force in 1995."9
Each labor union is concerned with promoting the interests of its
members, who constitute a minority of the work force and an even
smaller minority of the population. Labor unions, including the AFL-CIO
national federation, are therefore properly described as interest
groups--groups of people or institutions organized to promote a shared
interest different from, and possibly in conflict with, the interest of the
public.
We commonly discuss the activities of interest groups in relation to
the actions of government: How much has the lobbying efforts of an
interest group, such as organized labor, influenced Congressional or
59. See 1996 STATISTICAL ABsTRAcT, supra note 26, at 436 tbl.681.
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administrative action? To what extent have the activities of such an
interest group skewed legislation or regulation away from a proper
understanding of the public interest? Indeed, there is a substantial body
of theory devoted to an understanding of interest groups on government.
Although interest groups routinely attempt to influence lawmaking
and regulatory activities, some interest groups (such as organized labor)
can affect the public welfare in ways other than lobbying legislators and
administrators. They may cast burdens on society which arise as
externalities to bargains which they have privately negotiated. Labor
unions in particular and the companies with which they negotiate have
sometimes been accused of reaching collective bargaining agreements
which, while good for the parties, impose negative externalities on
society. The most frequent claims are that such agreements may engender
cost/push inflation, that they may inhibit exports, or that they may cause
unemployment.
A. Interest Groups and the Public Interest
Thoughtful observers have expressed concern about interest groups
and the way they relate to society and government since at least the late
eighteenth century. The Federalist papers explore at length the problems
presented by such groups, which they label as "factions." In The
Federalist No. 10, James Madison defines a faction as follows:
By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to
a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by
some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights
of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community.60
Madison further suggests that the sources of faction are often economic.
Indeed, he says that "the most common and durable source of factions"
lies in the "unequal distribution of property.",6' He then goes on to
identify more specific interests: "Those who are creditors, and those who
are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a
manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with
many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and
60. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).
61. Id.
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divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and
views."62
Indeed, it is the regulation of these various economic interests which
"forms the principal task of modern legislation" and necessarily "involves
the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of
government."'63 In his analysis, Madison is concerned with the relation
of a faction (or interest group) to government. But Madison would
probably have had no trouble applying much of his analysis to the way
an interest group can impose externalities on society as a result of its
activities.
The problem, as Madison sees it, is the conflict between the
factional interests and "the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community"4-certainly a formulation which is potentially applicable
to the imposition of negative externalities upon society by a self-
regarding interest group. According to Madison, problematic factional
interests come in two kinds. One kind of factional interest consists of a
misperception of one's own long-term interest. That is why Madison
refers to persons united by a "common impulse of passion"--passion
denoting a drive unduly centered on the present with insufficient
attention to the long-term.65
A second kind of problematic factional interest is consistent with the
holder's long-term interests but is inconsistent with "the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community."'66 This second type of factional
interest, Madison believes, is likely to be controlled by the forces of
majoritarian government, because a well-informed majority will not
permit the public good to be subordinated to the interest of a minority.
Note the ramifications of this conclusion by Madison for interest groups
which impose externalities on societies. Society will eventually act either
to restrict the abilities of interest groups to impose substantial negative
externalities on it, or society will alter the context in which the interest
group acts, so that the interest group will no longer be motivated to
impose those externalities.
Based on this analysis, the crux of the problem of faction lies in the
misperception by individuals and groups of their own long-term interests.
The first kind of problematic faction is defined by such a misperception.
62. Id. at 79.
63. Id.





It is dangerous when shared by interests which are powerful enough to
influence legislative outcomes. And the second kind presents a danger
when the majority fails to comprehend its own long-term interest, thus
becoming vulnerable to factional interests incompatible with long-term
public welfare.
Madison's description of faction recognizes that some individuals
possess shorter time horizons than the time horizon appropriate for the
community as a whole. Some especially self-centered individu-
als-perhaps those with no offspring and little empathy towards future
generations-might take no interest in events occurring after their deaths.
Some individuals might take no interest in the successes or failures of the
company for which they work which occur subsequent to their own
retirement. It is helpful to recognize that different individuals employ
different time horizons. The time horizon of an organization will reflect
the aggregate time horizons of its members, just as the breadth of an
organization's vision will probably reflect the diversity and inclusiveness
of its membership. As will be developed below, the degree to which an
organization's goals coincide or depart from the aggregate welfare of the
community, both in reference to its time horizon and in reference to its
concerns in the present period, depend critically upon the breadth and
inclusiveness of the organization's membership.
B. The Labor-Government Interface
In Europe, Japan, and the United States labor relations are, on the
surface, matters between workers and their employers. Wages, hours of
work, and other conditions of employment are the subjects of bargaining
between employers and unions representing employees, and these matters
are resolved in agreements between those parties. Yet in all of the
jurisdictions, government is, or has been involved, at the margins. All
advanced industrial nations regulate wages and working conditions
directly in minimum wage laws, in plant safety laws, and frequently in
laws governing dismissals.67 Indeed, in the United States, the complex
web of federal and state laws governing plant safety and employment
security have provided legal guarantees for matters traditionally protected
by labor unions. 8
Most jurisdictions regulate the organizing and collective bargaining
67. Cf GOULD, supra note 21, at 54-55 (discussing the validity of government labor
regulations in industrialized countries).
68. See id. at 55-58.
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process. In many jurisdictions, government is an active player in the
bargaining process, seeking to ensure that wage increases do not exceed
productivity gains. In some nations, such as Austria, the government has
actively sought to limit wage increases in order to attract investment and
to encourage exports; sometimes this has been done with the active
collaboration of labor unions who are willing to trade off short-term
gains for longer-term security.6 9
Thus, although collective bargaining is normally an activity carried
on in the private sector, the bargaining itself, the subjects which it
addresses, and its results are, or may at times be, matters of societal
concern. Governments, accordingly, not only regulate the bargaining
process, they often participate actively or on the sidelines. The directness
and visibility of government involvement has varied over time in the
various jurisdictions. The wage-price guidelines of the 1960s and the
Phases I and II Nixon incomes policies" are examples of government
involvement in the United States, as are the various neocorporatist
arrangements in Europe during the 1970s. In short, the process of
bargaining out wage rates has been thought to have societal ramifications
in most advanced economies. This Author contends that because the
outcomes of wage negotiations have often been thought to produce
consequences for the larger society--so much so that governments have
been active players in those negotiations-it may be proper to view the
bargaining process through the lens of interest group analysis and modern
public choice theory.
C. Modern Public Choice Theory
Public choice theory examines how interest groups exert pressure on
government to obtain legislation or policy initiatives favorable to
themselves.7' First, this analysis notes that interest groups characteristi-
cally seek their own (rather than the general) welfare. Second, it observes
that because of transaction costs and free rider problems, interests which
are concentrated are likely to be more successful in organizing and in
exerting pressure than are more diffuse interests. Thus business interests,
69. See PETER J. KATZENSTEIN, CORPORATISM AND CHANGE: AUSTRIA, SWnIZERLAND, AND
THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRY 35-36, 39, 47-49 (1984); Franz Traxler, Austria: Still the Country of
Corporatism, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE NEW EUROPE 270, 282-86 (Anthony Ferner &
Richard Hyman eds., 1992).
70. See supra note 39.
71. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 1-8 (1979); OLSON, LOGIC, supra note 33, at
9-16; see also DANIEL A. FARBER & PHIIP P. FRiCKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 14-15 (1991).
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especially monopolies or oligopolies, are most able to form successful
pressure groups while consumers-who are widely dispersed and each of
whom is likely to be affected only insubstantially-are among those least
likely to form successful pressure groups. This is true even though the
aggregate economic burden which a proposed government action may
impose on consumers is at least as large as the aggregate benefit that the
government action will bestow upon business.' The overall result is
likely to be a skewing of legislation and administration towards
benefiting those interests which are concentrated and upon each of whom
the impact of government action would amount to a significant portion
of income or wealth.
Mancur Olson, who articulated this analysis in the 1960s in The
Logic of Collective Action ("Logic"),73 later expanded its scope to
embrace the comparative evaluation of institutional arrangements among
nations. In his Rise and Decline of Nations ("Rise and Decline"), Olson
posits that in free societies, interest groups will develop organizational
means enabling them to pressure governments to skew legal and
regulatory frameworks to benefit them, and to cartelize markets where
possible.7 While the pressures and market restraints exerted by these
interest groups benefit the groups, they are harmful to the society as a
whole, because their activities result in misallocation of resources and
other inefficiencies. Moreover, Olson believes that the number of interest
groups pressuring government for favors grows with time. As a result,
he postulates, the longer a society has remained free, the more its
governing institutions are likely to be inefficiently skewed.75 Olson also
believes that some interest groups are able to impose cartel-like
constraints on markets, thus benefiting themselves at the expense of the
larger public.76 Again, the opportunities for interest groups to cartelize
extends with time, so that the oldest free societies are likely to have the
most extensive array of impediments upon the operation of their
markets.77
Olson concludes that those nations-generally those with the oldest
72. See OLSON, LOGIc, supra note 33, at 126-27.
73. See id. at 33-36, 165-67.
74. Olson employs the term "cartel" to refer to special-interest groups (or distributional
coalitions) which employ collusive action in the marketplace. Within the scope of that term are
professional associations, labor unions, trade associations, and oligopolies. See OLSON, RISME AND
DECLINE, supra note 33, at 44-46.
75. See id. at 77.
76. See id. at 44-46.
77. See id. at 77-80.
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free governing institutions-which have the largest numbers of organized
interest groups are likely to experience slower economic growth than are
nations with fewer organized interest groups.78 This is because interest
groups spend their efforts attempting to influence government to benefit
themselves at the expense of the common good and imposing restraints
and other cartel-like structures on markets, thus misallocating resources
and thereby slowing economic growth.79
D. The Olsonian Approach to Labor Union Behavior
Olson focuses upon the formation and organization of interest
groups and the interaction between interest groups, government, and
society. In Logic, he directed his attention to interest groups' use of
government power to further their own ends." In Rise and Decline, he
expands his focus to include cartelization and special-interest organiza-
tion within the private sector itself.81 Cartelization and special-interest
organization hamper the response of the market to changes in demand
and fluctuations in costs. Olson identifies labor unions as among those
interest groups which have both used government to further their interests
and which have cartelized the labor supply of a number of industries.82
Among Olson's complaints are that decision-making over the wage rate
is sluggish, collective bargaining contracts in the United States generally
running for three years, and that wages are especially sticky down-
wards.83 He concludes that the ponderousness of collective bargaining
procedures prevents unionized industries from responding to market
changes, forcing the needed adjustments upon the nonunionized sectors:
unemployed workers in the rigid unionized sectors seek and find work
in the less rigid nonunionized sectors. 4 The result is that the economy
adjusts badly to economic fluctuations and is less than optimally
productive. Olson, however, excludes from his analysis the large German
and Swedish unions which embrace much of the work force. Such
organizations are, in Olson's terminology, "encompassing" organizations
which-because of their large membership relative to the economy--take
78. See id. at 75.
79. See id. at 47.
80. See OLsON, LOGIC, supra note 33, at 3.
81. See OLSON, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 33, at 44-46.
82. See id. at 102-06.
83. See id. at 204.
84. See id. at 204-05.
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on a societal perspective." Such organizations are less likely than the
industry-specific American unions to pursue goals which further their
members' interests at the expense of the larger society because the broad-
based membership of the Swedish and German unions helps to ensure
that the aggregate interests of their members largely coincide with the
interest of society. 6 Olson's distinction between encompassing and
nonencompassing organizations is especially helpful in addressing
comparative union organization and industrial relations. So, too, is his
concern with rapid and flexible responses of productive institutions to
changes in demand and input costs.
It was noted above that collective bargaining has often been a
subject of government concern and intervention, both in the United States
and elsewhere. Neocorporatist arrangements within the United States
during the 1950s,8 ' and in much of Europe during the entire post-World
War IT period,88 as well as the pursuit of incomes policies in the United
States during the 1960s and 1970s' 9 evidence the concern of govern-
ments with the results of wage bargaining. The reason why the wage
bargain was the subject of the express concern and involvement of the
U.S. government during the three decades subsequent to World War II
was because of its perceived potential for engendering inflation.
European governments not only sought to restrain inflation," but they
85. See id. at 49.
86. However, even the broad base of the largest Swedish labor confederation may be
insufficiently encompassing to guarantee public interest regarding behavior. See infra note 205 and
accompanying text.
87. See DUBOFSKY, supra note 5, at 210, 216-17.
88. See generally THE CORPORATE STATE (Andrew Cox & Noel O'Sullivan eds., 1988).
89. The Kennedy-Johnson wage-price guidelines, the Nixon Phase I and II income policies,
and the Carter wage standards program all intervened in various degrees into the results of
bargaining. See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 39, at 54849 (discussing U.S. government
intervention into the collective bargaining process).
90. Not all European governments have envisioned the wage bargain as directly connected with
inflation. In Scandinavia, where wage negotiations have been viewed through the lens of the
so-called Aukrust model of wage bargaining, inflation is seen as a function of world prices and
differences in productivity trends in the trading and nontrading sectors of the economy. In this view,
inflation is not a function of the wage bargain but is largely a condition imposed upon small trading
nations by external conditions and differences in internal productivity growth rates. See Robert J.
Flanagan, Efficiency and Equality in Swedish Labor Markets, in THE SWEDISH ECONOMY 125, 160
(Barry P. Bosworth & Alice M. Rivlin eds., 1987); see also EIGRHEN ET AL., supra note 49, at 70-71
(noting that the "international competitiveness" of "small industrial countries with a large foreign
trade ... is placed at the centre of the analysis" when discussing incomes policies). The Swedish
government ultimately sought to control inflation through monetary policy and by stabilizing the
exchange rate. See Barry P. Bosworth & Robert Z. Lawrence, Economic Goals and the Policy Mix,
in THE SWEDISH ECONOMY, supra, at 97, 103, 105.
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sought as well to foster exports, induce investment, and increase
employment. This government involvement has sought to impose limits
upon what the parties might otherwise agree upon in order to safeguard
the interests of the larger society.91
In these cases, the problem was whether labor unions and employers
would reach agreements which would exceed productivity growth. If
overall wage increases did exceed productivity growth, then labor costs
would rise with a concomitant upward pressure on prices. As prices
increased, demand would slacken, forcing the monetary authorities to
make a hard choice. To maintain employment, the monetary authorities
would have to expand the money supply, an action which would produce
an upward pressure on prices, thus leading to inflation.92 Conversely, to
resist inflation, the monetary authorities would have to contain the money
supply, countenancing unemployment until the economy adjusted to this
constraint.93 Because democratic governments have found the latter
option unattractive, they have sought refuge in incomes policies, inducing
restraint on wage rates, so that they would not have to face this dilemma.
In Europe, governments faced concerns in addition to, or apart from,
the inflation problem. European governments concerned with exports and
following an Aukrust wage model would see a comparable problem:
unions and employers which negotiated wages which outran productivity
increases would erode the international competitiveness of their export
industries as well as generate inflation.94 The problem is mitigated when
a single overall union represents all or most of the work force, because
in that case, the union membership is representative of society generally
and shares the burden of inflation with the rest of society. For that
reason, it was easier, at least in theory, for European governments to
succeed in moderating wage demands. By contrast, in the United States
where union organization follows industry lines, powerful unions like the
UAW and the United Steel Workers had more to gain than to lose by
pushing for wage settlements that outran productivity gains.95 In
91. See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 39, at 547-48.
92. See ROBERT J. GORDON, MACROECONOMICS 191-92 (1978); see also Karen Orren, Union
Politics and Postwar Liberalism in the United States, 1946-1979, in I STUDIES IN AMERICAN
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 215,243 (Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek eds., 1986) (contending that
organized labor's consistent political strategy has been directed towards expansionary monetary
policies).
93. See Orren, supra note 92, at 244.
94. See EDGREN ET AL., supra note 49, at 134-35.




oligopolistic industries like the auto and steel industries of the 1970s,
wage increases would be partially passed on in higher prices. The union
gained disproportionately and the burden was spread over the entire
society.
Let us now consider the impact of union organization following
industry lines in terms of resource allocation (an issue identified in
Olson's analysis of comparative institutional structure), sluggish
responses to market fluctuations, and loss of productivity. 6 This
Author's particular focus is on the wage bargain. The goal of the UAW
is to enhance the welfare of automobile workers. The UAW, accordingly,
will attempt to force the wage level of automobile workers to ever higher
levels. The union's likelihood of success in this endeavor depends upon
the industry's profitability. The more profitable the industry, the more
able the industry's employers will be to meet the union's demands. Note,
further, that when a union successfully organizes an entire industry, the
union is in the position of a monopoly supplier of labor to that industry's
employers. Whether or not the employers bargain as a group, the union
possesses substantial power over a critical input, and that power will
ultimately be reflected in the product market.
Union control over the industry's labor supply is different from a
monopoly which might be possessed by a business firm over some other
input in that there is no profit-maximizing standard by which to make
theoretical predictions about how that power might be exercised.97 At
least in theory, a business concern possesses a clear economic goal:
maximize short-rn profits. By analogy, the union might decide to
maximize the stream of compensation routed to labor. But it might not,
because the union is not a profit-making enterprise. Moreover, the
seniority system is likely to affect the way a union approaches the
wage/unemployment tradeoff: Since the workers who have been longest
employed will be laid off last, there is a built-in bias of the membership
towards sacrificing the welfare of the most recently employed workers
in favor of wage increases for the bulk with the greatest seniority."
Restated, this bias is towards contraction and high labor costs, rather than
towards expansion and moderate labor costs.
During most of the 1950s and 1960s, industry-wide union organiza-
tion worked to further union goals, because American producers were not
96. See OLSON, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 33, at 211-14.
97. See REES, supra note 57, at 47.
98. See Gifford, supra note 14, at 1411-14.
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exposed to substantial competition from foreign rivals." As a result,
industrial unions could exploit their control over the industry labor
supply, with opposition by employers tempered by the fact that wage
costs could be passed on, in substantial part, to buyers in the product
market. As foreign competition in many markets increased in intensity
during the last three decades, many American producers found them-
selves saddled with high labor costs vis-d-vis their foreign rivals.
Professor Junichi Goto has shown how American automobile producers
have been disadvantaged vis-d-vis their Japanese rivals as a result of the
high labor costs resulting from Big Three negotiations with the
UAW.' As Goto points out, the problem is not whether American
wages are higher or lower than those in Japan."' Rather, the problem
is more complex and directly results from the organization of American
unions on an industry-by-industry basis. While Japanese unions are
organized on an even less encompassing company-by-company basis,
wage increases are determined in the "Spring Offensive" from an
economy-wide perspective.' °2 The comparative disadvantage in labor
costs borne by the American producers results from the fact that the
differential between auto workers and other manufacturing workers is
higher in the United States than in Japan. 3 This differential is a tribute
to the success of the UAW in advancing the welfare of its members, but
it may also constitute an indictment of the way American unions are
structured.
Differences in overall wage levels will be washed out in the
currency markets, where economy-wide effects are reflected in the way
currencies relate to each other. But differences in wage levels among the
industries of any one nation will not wash out. Thus, those industries
with differentially high wage structures will bear the burden of those
high wage structures in competition with foreign rivals whose wage
structures are not so differentially high within their own countries. The
result is that self-interested bargaining by industry-specific unions
imposing differentially high labor costs upon American employers have
handicapped their employers in international competition. This result
works to the disadvantage of the American working class which would
99. See id. at 1403-04.
100. See GOTO, supra note 27, at 65-66.
101. See id. at 63-66.
102. See id. at 65-66; see also RONALD DORE, FLEXIBLE RIGIDITIES 24 (1986); infra Part
IV.C.2.
103. See GOTO, supra note 27, at 59-61, 135.
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benefit immensely from an expansion of the domestic auto industry and
other high wage industries.
E. The Encompassing Unions in Sweden and Germany
Olson points out that organizations whose membership includes
representation from all or much of the overall society are more likely to
have interests and goals which coincide with society's aggregate
welfare. 4 Olson refers to these organizations as "encompassing"
organizations. 5  The Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions
(Landsorganisationen iSverige or "LO") bargains for the entire Swedish
blue-collar labor force, cutting across all industries.0 6 Thus freed by its
broad representational responsibility from seeking the welfare of workers
in a narrow industrial sector at the expense of workers in other sectors,
the LO approaches Olson's model of an encompassing organization.
According to Olson, the LO would be expected to seek objectives which
would be more consistent with the broad welfare of Swedish society than
would unions organized on a more narrow focus, such as on an industry,
enterprise, or craft basis. 7 The broad representational role played by
the LO has enabled wage bargaining in Sweden to take an effective tri-
partite form, with labor (through the LO), employers (through the
Swedish Employers' Confederation (Svenska Arbetsgivarefdreningen or
"SAF")), and government periodically working out the framework of
acceptable wage bargains.0 8 For a period of time the LO, in coopera-
tion with the government, kept its overall wage demands within a
framework which was designed to prevent wage/push inflation, while
simultaneously (under a so-called "solidaristic wage policy") seeking to
contain pressures for increases at the higher ends of the wage scale. 9
Indeed, at one time Sweden was one of the leading practitioners of
neocorporatism,"0 an institutional arrangement under which labor,
industry, and government work out wage settlements designed to
104. See OLSON, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 33, at 48.
105. See id. at 47-48.
106. See Flanagan, supra note 90, at 129.
107. See OLSON, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 33, at 48.
108. See Flanagan, supra note 90, at 129.
109. See id. at 131-32; see also Hammarstr6m, supra note 43, at 189-90 (noting that Swedish
unions "assumed partial responsibility for the national economic performance").
110. See Neil Elder, Corporatism in Sweden, in THE CORPORATE STATE, supra note 88, at
153-54.
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reconcile long-term labor welfare with the overall economic national
welfare.
Ultimately, the Swedish neocorporatist experiment broke down. The
failure appears to have resulted from the LO's being insufficiently
encompassing. The LO did not represent public-sector workers nor did
it represent white-collar workers."' As a result, inter-union rivalries
generated pressure on the LO and the other unions to compete in their
wage demands, thus undermining their ability to further long term goals
through short-term restraint--the approach which underlines
neocorporatism."2
IV. LABOR RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY,
SWEDEN, AND JAPAN
A. The United States
1. Historical Background
In the early decades of the twentieth century, labor demands for
government protection against the rigors of free labor markets were
finding increasingly sympathetic responses from Congress and the
various state legislatures, but were being resisted by the courts. The
United States Supreme Court invalidated legislation establishing
minimum wages,"' maximum hours," 4 and the prohibition of child
labor."' Eventually, the Court reversed itself on all of these issues,
implicitly conceding the validity of Justice Holmes admonition that "[tihe
Fourteenth Amendment [is not an enactment of] Mr. Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics.""' 6 The courts were equally hostile to the efforts of
workers to improve their position through self-help; indeed, the federal
I11. See Flanagan, supra note 90, at 129.
112. See id. at 162-63; see also Wolfgang Streeck, The Rise and Decline of Neocorporatism,
in LABOR AND AN INTEGRATED EUROPE 80, 85-86 (Lloyd Ulman et al. eds., 1993).
113. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
114. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
115. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); see also Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.,
259 U.S. 20 (1922) (invalidating a law passed by Congress imposing an excise tax on goods
produced by child labor).
116. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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judiciary often used the antitrust laws against collective action by
workers.
117
During the early part of the century, many states enacted worker
compensation statutes, providing limited but relatively certain compensa-
tion for work-related injuries." 8 Most states also enacted legislation
providing for minimum wages.19 At the national level, Congress
enacted worker compensation type legislation applicable to longshore-
men, seamen, and other areas, such as the District of Columbia, where
the congressional power was widely recognized.2 ' In 1914, Congress
included sections 6121 and 20" in the Clayton Act in an attempt to
free labor unions from judicial interference. Section 6 declared that "the
labor of a human being [was] not [an] article of commerce" and so not
subject to any of the antitrust laws." Section 20 expressly forbade the
courts from interfering with strikes and other traditional ways in which
labor sought redress. 24
Active federal involvement in labor relations began no later than the
Erdman Act of 1898,"z an act which recognized the right of railroad
workers to organize and which established a system of voluntary
arbitration for labor disputes, including disputes over wages. Federal
involvement in labor relations reached new heights during World War I
through the activities of a Special Mediation Commission, the War Labor
Conference Board, the War Labor Policies Board, and a National War
Labor Board.'26 Under the aegis of these bodies, trade union member-
117. See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) (finding that the use
of secondary boycotts by unions was a block to free competition); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274
(1908) (finding that a union was preventing an employer from manufacturing and participating in
interstate commerce).
118. See Jill Williford, Comment, Reformers'Regress: The 1991 Texas Workers' Compensation
Act, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J 1111, 1117-18 & n.38 (1991).
119. See Stephanie A. Levin, Grassroots Voices: Local Action and National Military Policy,
40 BUFF. L. REV. 321, 365 n.189 (1992).
120. See Longshoreman and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 69-803,44 Stat.
1424 (1927) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1994)); Merchant Marine (Jones) Act,
Pub. L. No. 66-261, 41 Stat. 988 (1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1994)); LaFollete
Seamen's Act, Pub. L. No. 63-302, 38 Stat. 1164 (1915) (repealed 1983); see also 33 U.S.C. § 902
(applying the Longshoreman and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act to the District of Columbia).
121. See Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 6,38 Stat. 730,731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 17
(1994)).
122. See id. § 20, 38 Stat. at 738 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1994)).
123. Id. § 6.
124. See id. § 20.
125. Ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424 (1898) (repealed 1913).
126. See DUBOFsKY, supra note 5, at 70-72.
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ship increased almost seventy percent to more than five million members
and twenty percent of the work force during the period from 1917 to
1920.127 Continuing the federal involvement in labor relations, the
Transportation Act of 1920'28 contained extensive conciliation and
arbitration provisions, employing tripartite boards composed of govern-
ment, labor, and public representatives.'29 Again, the Railway Labor
Act of 1926 and its 1934 amendments established a system of exclusive
bargaining representatives in the railroad industry.
13
With the advent of the Great Depression, federal involvement
broadened. President Franklin Roosevelt's administration, newly selected
in November 1932, successfully encouraged the Congress to enact the
NIRA 3' when it took office in the following spring. The NIRA was
designed as a radical restructuring of American industry into a cartel-like
format, pursuant to the economic approach of the early New Deal to
"reflate" the economy by pushing up prices until business leaders found
it profitable to expand production. 3 1 Section 7 of the NIRA required
that all of the cartel-like agreements (or industry "codes of fair competi-
tion" as the Act referred to them) established under the Act include a
provision guaranteeing workers the right to organize labor unions and to
bargain collectively with their employers.3 1
When the NIRA was invalidated by the Supreme Court in 1935, 3a
the labor provisions fell with the rest of the Act. Congress, however, was
then moved to enact the NLRA-incorporating the substance of section
7 of the NIRA-in order to ensure continuing legal protection for
workers to bargain collectively with employers. 3 1 The NLRA creates
statutory rights of workers to organize into labor unions, and through
those unions to bargain collectively with their employers over wages,
127. See id. at 74.
128. Pub. L. No. 66-152,41 Stat. 456 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
129. See DUBOFSKY, supra note 5, at 81.
130. See Railway Labor Act of 1926, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (current version codified at 45
U.S.C. §§ 151-181 (1994)); Railway Labor Act of 1934, ch. 691, 48 Stat. 577 (current version
codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-181 (1994)).
131. See supra note 2.
132. See J. GEORGE FREDERICK, A PRIMER OF "NEW DEAL" ECONOMICS 101-03 (1933); Daniel
J. Gifford, The New Deal Regulatory Model: A History of Criticisms and Refinements, 68 MINN. L.
REv. 299, 300-07 (1983).
133. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 7,48 Stat. 195,198-99 (1933) (repealed by Act
of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 8, 80 Stat. 648).
134. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-51 (1935).
135. See National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
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hours, and working conditions. 36 Employers have a corresponding
statutory obligation to bargain in good faith with a union chosen by their
employees. 37 A refusal by an employer to bargain and various interfer-
ences by an employer with the process through which its employees
select a collective bargaining representative are made "unfair labor
practices," subjecting the offending employer to enforcement proceedings
before the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB").' In 1947 the
Taft-Hartley Act amended the NLRA to include a set of union unfair
labor practices. 39
2. The Rise of "Industrial" Unions
Until the 1930s, the "craft" unions were the predominant form of
labor organization in the United States. 4 Most of these unions were
affiliated with the AFL.4 Both the NIRA and the NLRA encouraged
the formation of unions on a wider basis than craft. By requiring industry
code provisions recognizing the right of workers to organize, the NIRA
encouraged this wider paradigm. Yet many employers evaded the NIRA's
implicit endorsement of industrial unions by recognizing "company
unions," unions whose memberships were limited to a particular
company's employees and which were effectively dominated by that
company's management.' As the successor to the labor provisions in
the NIRA, the NLRA included provisions carefully designed to outlaw
company-dominated unions and the NLRA was widely perceived as
fostering union organization on the broad scale of industrial unions.'
Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the enactment of the NLRA, the
then nascent CIO vigorously pursued a strategy of organizing mass-
production workers into industrial unions."4 When an industrial union
organizes the workers in all or most of the firms in its industry,
employers no longer are constrained by competition from unorganized
rivals from acceding to union demands. During the decade or so from the
136. See id.
137. See id. § 157(d).
138. See id. § 158(a).
139. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136
(1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1994 & Supp. 1997)).
140. See WELER, supra note 22, at 194-95.
141. See id.
142. See Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company Union" Prohibition: The
Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 125, 129-131 (1994).
143. See WErLER, supra note 22, at 9.
144. See FREEMAN & MEDorr, supra note 30, at 244.
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late 1930s to the late 1940s, the CIO had overseen the full unionization
of numerous industries. 145
3. The Adversarial Model of Industrial Relations
Observers generally describe U.S. industrial relations as following
an adversarial model."4 The focus of those relations has almost
invariably been upon economic points of conflict between workers and
employers. Unions historically have taken the position that the success
or failure of the enterprise is solely the responsibility of the employ-
er. 47 The craft unions commit to high quality standards by their
members, but they recognize no obligation beyond the quality of each
individual's work." Craft unions were accordingly comfortable with
the Taylorite approach to efficiency, prevalent in the first quarter of the
present century.'49 Taylorite analysis identifies the techniques and
quality levels required, generally breaking productive motions into
component parts for analysis and control. The craft unions would meet
the quality standards identified by Taylorite analysis, but they would do
no more. Moreover, the craft unions have also adopted rules setting
maximum quantitative standards for work. Craft unions have always
defined the boundaries of their craft, as a means of identifying their
jurisdiction to themselves and others, a practice which reinforces the
limited obligation, metes-and-bounds approach to job commitment. 5 °
The limited obligation approach to work characteristic of craft
unions has analogues in industrial unions. Industrial unions typically
identify jobs and negotiate work rules with employers. Work rules are,
in part, a device to protect existing workers from excessive employer
145. See id.; see also RICHARD VIGILANTE, STRIKE 216-17 (1994) (describing the strike tactics
used by the CIO in the 1930s).
146. See DUBOFSKY, supra note 5, at 197 (discussing the power of unions in the twentieth
century); VIGILANTE, supra note 145, at 11 (describing the struggle for control over the Daily News
as a "holy war"). But cf. Morris, supra note 25, at 526 (claiming that the notion that the NLRA
requires an adversarial relationship between employers and unions is a myth).
147. See DuBOFSKY, supra note 5, at 181-84.
148. See VIGILANTE, supra note 145, at 49-50.
149. See JAMS G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIzATIONS 12-22 (1958) (discussing
Taylorism); see also VIGILANTE, supra note 145, at 48-49 (discussing the relation between the
outlook of craft unions and Taylorism); Estreicher, supra note 142, at 133-34. See generally
FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (Basic Books, Inc.
1985) (1911) (introducing Taylorite analysis, which identifies the techniques and quality levels
required for each stage of production, generally breaking tasks into component parts for analysis and
control).
150. See VIGILANTE, supra note 145, at 49-50.
19971
HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW
demands and, in part, a device to force the employer to hire more
workers.' Management has sought to protect its control over produc-
tion through the negotiation of management-rights clauses in collective
bargaining contracts, clauses which generally recognize management's
control over production decisions and decisions incidental thereto.'
Problems arise in the interface between the extensive management rights
usually incorporated into collective bargaining contracts and preexisting
work rules or practices which, in management's view, need to be
modified in the interest of production efficiency.
The practices of defining union jurisdiction by job definition,
defining work, establishing job definitions, and writing work rules
become troublesome when technology changes. There is always a danger
of jurisdictional disputes arising when a craft union's jurisdictional
assertions are ambiguous or imprecise or overlap the jurisdictional
assertions of another union. The potential for such disputes is enhanced
when changing technologies alter the premises upon which jurisdictional
definitions were written. Work rules written for a static work place raise
costs when the efficient use of new technology requires different
behavior from that contemplated by those rules. The New York Daily
News strike is an extreme example of the problems which result from the
clash of imbedded work rules and job definitions after a technological
change. 153
The NLRA assumes the conflict model and incorporates it in the
legal structure it establishes over collective bargaining."'4 The NLRA
tries to insulate the organizing processes from employer influences and
to confine bargaining to negotiations between company and union
representatives. Because many employers had used "company unions" as
a device for escaping their obligations under the NIRA, the NLRA is
especially hostile to company unions.'55 The NLRA, accordingly, draws
151. See Stephen I. Schlossberg, Epilogue: On Tipping the Balance in Labor-Management
Relations, in AMERICAN LABOR POLICY 406, 410 (Charles J. Morris ed., 1987).
152. See id.
153. See VIGILATE, supra note 145, at 61, 94-95, 97.
154. See Thomas C. Kohler, Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Significance of
Section 8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. REV. 499, 515 (1986); see also Estreicher, supra note 142, at 131 (noting
that the NLRA established the NLRB to adjudicate employment claims). But see Barenberg, supra
note 1, at 1385-89 (taking a revisionist view of the NLRA's origins). Barenberg argues that Senator
Wagner and other supporters of the NLRA envisioned a cooperative relationship between labor and
capital ultimately emerging from that Act's guarantee of workers' organizational and collective
bargaining rights. See id.
155. See Martin T. Moe, Participatory Worlplace Decisionmaking and the NLRA: Section
8(a)(2), Electromation, and the Specter of the Company Union, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1127, 1134-42
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a sharp focus between legitimate labor organizations on the one hand and
employers on the other.'56 It assumes a Taylorite technology, in which
communication about production between employees and employers
proceeds primarily in one direction, from supervisory personnel to
workers. The NLRA recognizes that some two-way communication
between employers and workers is necessary, but assumes that the
subjects for all two-way communications are wages, hours, and
conditions of employment-matters which must be discussed only
through company interaction with union representatives. 57
The conflict model of labor relations implicitly incorporated into the
NLRA differs remarkably from German and Japanese models of labor
relations.'58 Although the German and Japanese approaches to labor
relations are superficially very different from each other, industrial
relations in both nations involve higher degrees of cooperation and joint
decision-making than does the U.S. model. In recent years, U.S. industry
has increasingly attempted to utilize the cooperative efforts of workers
in expanding productivity and raising quality. A major device for
securing such assistance from workers is the so-called "quality circle"
device, through which small groups of workers discuss means of
improving production and quality with a management representative. The
best known examples of quality circles and related forms of employee
involvement in workplace decision-making in the United States are at the
General Motors' Saturn Plant and at the General Motors/Toyota joint
venture, New United Motors Manufacturing, Inc. ('tNMMT') in
Fremont, California;'59 however, the use of quality circles and other
forms of employee involvement is widespread.6 Unfortunately, the
conflict model built into the NLRA has cast a cloud over the lawfulness
(1993).
156. See National Labor Relations Act § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994).
157. See id. § 9.
158. See Clyde W. Summers, Comparison of Collective Bargaining Systems: The Shaping of
Plant Relationships and National Economic Policy, 16 COMP. LAB. L.J. 467, 468, 473, 475 (1995)
(arguing that the U.S. model is an "adversarial" model; that the Japanese model is a "cooperative"
model; and that the German model incorporates aspects of both the adversarial model and the
cooperative model).
159. Employee involvement at the NUMMI and Satum plants is discussed in GOULD, supra note
21, at 123-31; see also Barenberg, supra note 10, at 888-89 (discussing the NUMMI and Saturn
"team" practices).
160. Professor Estreicher lists Ford, Motorola, Texas Instruments, General Foods, Procter &
Gamble, General Electric, TRW, and Eastman Kodak as among many leading business firms
employing this form of employee involvement. See Estreicher, supra note 142, at 138.
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of quality circles.' NLRB Chairman William Gould has called for
amendments to the NLRA which would "allow for cooperative relation-
ships between employees and the employer,"'6 but President Clinton
has recently vetoed such legislation, 63 thus reinforcing the adversary
model built into the NLRA.
4. An "Industry" Focus to Collective Agreements
Because large industrial unions have controlled the labor supply of
a number of industries (especially the traditional mass-production
industries such as automobiles and steel), wage rates are negotiated for
each industry. The union either negotiates with employers as a group,
"multiemployer bargaining," or engages in so-called "pattern bargain-
ing."' In the normal course, an agreement in the former situation
binds all employers. In pattern bargaining, the union negotiates an
agreement with one employer which is used as a "pattern" for agree-
ments with the other firms in the industry.'65 Both the union and the
employer with which it is negotiating understand that the union will do
its utmost to ensure that each of the other firms in the industry accede to
terms similar to the pattern agreement. These practices impose similar
161. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.LRB. 990, 997 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir.
1994); see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 897 (1993) (confirming the
interpretation of the NLRA in Electromation); Chen & Gifford, supra note 40, at 1334 ("American
labor law operates dysfunctionally by blocking attempts at labor/management cooperation in the
workplace through 'quality circles."). But see General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1235 (1977)
(holding that autonomous employee committees were not labor organizations under the meaning of
section 2(5) of the NLRA, and thus did not constitute a section 8(a)(2) violation).
162. GOULD, supra note 21, at 60; see also id. at 142 (advocating the reform of NLRA
section 8(a)(2) and suggesting a more flexible demarcation between supervisors and employees);
William B. Gould IV, Employee Participation and Labor Policy: Why the Team Act Should Be
Defeated and the National Labor Relations Act Amended, 30 CREIGHTON L. REv. 3, 8-11 (1996)
(advocating that autonomous employee committees be permitted through reform of the NLRA).
Professor Mark Barenberg provides an elaborate description of team organization and its evolution
with a discussion of its efficiency potential. See Barenberg, supra note 10, at 897-904, Barenberg,
however, also criticizes some manifestations of team organization, particularly the so-called "Toyota
System," which he finds oppressive. See id. at 911-12. Professor Samuel Estreicher has repeatedly
called for amendments to the NLRA to facilitate increased employee involvement in workplace
decision-making. See Estreicher, supra note 142, at 150-55; Estreicher, supra note 54, at 22-27, 35.
163. See President's Message, supra note 20, at 1378-79.
164. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116, 2122 (1996) ("Multiemployer bargaining.,.
is a well-established, pervasive method of collective bargaining .... ."); Local Union No. 189,
Amalghmated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 722 (1965)
(Goldberg, J., concurring in the result and dissenting from the opinion) ("[T]erms and conditions of
employment in a given industry. . are often secured.. . through bargaining with market leaders
that sets a 'pattern' for agreements on labor standards with other employers.").
165. See Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 722.
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terms upon all employers, thus serving the interests of both the
employers and the union. The employers have assurance that no rival
possesses a labor cost advantage, and the union wage scale is protected
from competitive pressure exerted by lower-wage employers.
Because bargaining occurs on an industry basis, wage increases are
likely to reflect the profitability of the industry-the more profitable
industries being able to afford the greater wage increases. Indeed, not
surprisingly, high profits have generally acted as a stimulus to union
wage demands. 66 The wage/profit relationship has entered into the
public discourse. Commentators upon labor relations frequently ask
whether a wage increase has been held within the limits of productivity
gains. 67 The premise for such a question is that wage increases are
expected as industries become more efficient, and efficiency gains are
expected to be translated into higher wages.
In the quarter-century following the end of World War II, many of
the most profitable industries (such as automobiles and steel) were mass
production industries whose efficiencies were the result of scale
economies.'63 Because scale economies dictated that each firm account
for a large volume of production, the number of producers in these
industries was limited. The automobile, steel, and other mass production
industries thus tended to be oligopolies.69 The expected result was that
these industries priced their goods oligopolistically. Since the labor force
of these industries generally was organized, the oligopolistic effects in
the product market were exacerbated by the monopoly power exerted in
the labor market by the industrial unions which negotiated the wage
rates. These industries thus experienced a double monopoly effect, as the
monopoly over the labor supply was compounded when the oligopolists
in the output market added their own monopoly-profit component to the
pricing of the final product.
B. Europe
European labor practices reflect wide divergence as well as long and
complex histories. In France, the union movement is divided along
ideological lines. There, several rival unions organize workers in each
166. See Dau-Schnidt, supra note 58, at 472-73.
167. See id.
168. See Julius G. Getman & F. Ray Marshall, Industrial Relations in Transition: The Paper
Industry Example, 102 YALE L.J. 1803, 1807 (1993).
169. See id. at 1808.
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industry and occupation.17 The competition which this situation
encourages among unions is further complicated by the fact that, under
the law, a collective bargaining agreement applying across the board
comes into effect when signed by the employer and a single union.''
Because of the poor quality of union representation and declining union
membership, some observers believe that works councils, an institution
borrowed by France from Germany, may ultimately replace unions as the
effective negotiators of collective agreements. 72 In contrast to the
ineffective unions of France, the unions of Germany and Sweden provide
a dramatically different picture. There, large and powerful unions control
most of the industrial labor force.
1. Germany
a. Some Background and History
In Germany, the largest unions are the Union of Metal Industry
Workers ("IG Metall"), the Union of Public Service, Transport and
Communications Workers ("Gewerkschaft Offentliche Dienste, Transport
und erkehr"), and the Union of Chemical, Paper and Ceramics Industry
Workers ("IG Chemie-Papier-Kerami").n Because the jurisdiction of
IG Metall extends to workers dealing in any way with "metal," its
jurisdiction extends across industry lines, representing the workers
employed by most manufacturing companies. 74
German unions were not always as powerful as the metalworkers are
today. At the end of World War I, Catholic, communist, and socialist
unions competed for the allegiance of workers 75 in the manner of the
French unions of today. Inter-union rivalries, which continued throughout
the Weimar Republic, ensured their weakness and also ensured that they
170. These are the Confedgration Gndrale du Travail ("CGT"), the Confdddration Frangaise
Dhmocratique du Travail ("CFDT"), the Force Ouvrire, and the Confeddration Frangaise des
Travailleurs Chritiens ("CFTC"). See ROBERT J. FLANAGAN ET AL., UNIONISM, ECONOMIC
STABILIzATION, AND INCOMES POLICIES: EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 580 (1983).
171. See Jean-Frangois Amadieu, Industrial Relations: Is France a Special Case?, 33 BRIT. J.
INDUS. REL. 345, 347 (1995).
172. See id. at 348-49.
173. See Friedrich Fuerstenberg, Industrial Relations in the Federal Republic of Germany, in
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra note 43, at 165, 168.
174. See Carol D. Rasnic, Who Holds the Employment Contract "Trump Card"? Comparing
Labor Laws in Germany and the United States for the International Investor, 4 IND. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 33, 37 (1993) (stating the German metal industry "includes automobile, electric, ship-
building, and machine-building companies, among others").
175. See MAIER, supra note 3, at 449.
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did not, by cooperating, achieve monopoly control over the labor supply.
During the Weimar period, Germany operated under a regime in which
wage disputes ultimately were disposed of through compulsory arbitra-
tion. 76 The Weimar period also made a lasting contribution to German
labor relations: the works councils.' n
Works councils, originally mandated by legislation in 1920, are
composed of representatives elected by the workers at each plant."'
They were abolished during the Nazi period, but were reestablished at the
end of World War H.79 Works councils consult and negotiate with
plant management about a variety of local matters. Under legislation
enacted in 1972, works councils possess codetermination rights over
changes in the pace of work and in the work environment.' ° They also
operate, inter alia, as a mechanism for resolving grievances. Germany has
further enhanced worker participation in workplace governance by
requiring representatives on company boards, first in the coal and steel
industries and then in all industries.' These extensive rights to
176. See id. at 446.
177. The official system of worker representation embodied in the works councils dates back
to the end of World War I. At the end of the war, Germany was in turmoil. In the aftermath of the
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, many feared a repetition of that revolution in all or parts of
Germany. During the 1919-1920 period, rhetoric about worker seizure of factories was widespread.
By the end of 1920, however, this rhetoric had been transformed-partially through the efforts of
the Social Democratic Party ("SPD")-into a movement for "works councils" in factories. See a
at 138-40, 160-64. This modified movement was successful. German works councils were enacted
into law. They flourished during the Weimar Republic. They were renewed at the end of World War
I. Worker participation was dramatically expanded during the 1970s when legislation put worker
representatives on company boards. See Clyde W. Summers, Worker Participation in the U.S. and
West Germany: A Comparative Study from an American Perspective, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 367, 375,
384 (1980) (discussing the Works Council Act of 1920 and the Codetermination Act of 1976); see
also Summers, supra note 158, at 475-76 (noting that the Works Constitution Act of 1972 does not
approve of an antagonistic relationship between the employer and the works council).
178. See Summers, supra note 177, at 375.
179. See id.
180. See Fuerstenberg, supra note 173, at 176.
181. In 1951, codetermination legislation placed worker representatives on the supervisory
boards of coal and steel companies and a labor representative on company managing boards. German
companies have a managing board (Vorstand) which implements most decisions and a higher
supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) which appoints the top managers and approves major decisions but,
because it meets only four times a year, cannot interfere in company management. See id. at 170.
In 1976, codetermination legislation placed worker representatives on the supervisory boards of all
companies with more than 2000 employees. In the coal and steel industries, the shareholders select
their representatives and the labor representatives are chosen by works councils and unions. In
industries other than coal and steel, at least one of the labor representatives is nominated by the
senior executives and, in impasse situations, the chairman (who is a shareholders' representative)
casts the deciding vote. See id. at 177.
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participate in workplace governance, created by the works council
legislation and the codetermination laws, have engendered a union
infrastructure which collects and synthesizes information essential to the
active exercise of these participation rights.' As a result, unions
consult with employers on a wider range of issues than is customary in
the United States. This means, in turn, that collective bargaining from the
union side is broadly informed.
b. The Double Official/Unofficial Format to Bargaining
and Negotiation
Present-day German labor relations takes place in two somewhat
parallel formats. First is the format in which one of the major unions
bargains with an employers' association at a regional or national level
over wages and working conditions.'83 Agreements on wages are
negotiated for the entire metalworking sector between IG Metall and the
employers' associations. The broad membership of the union (IG Metall)
representing manufacturing workers means that bargaining, at least on the
union side, is carried on with concern for broad-based economic effects
extending beyond the impact on any one particular industry. Similarly,
the manufacturers' associations bargaining with IG Metall embrace most
major manufacturing industries. The manufacturers' associations thus also
bargain with concern for economic effects extending beyond any one
industry. As a result of this form of bargaining and intersectoral
cooperation among employers, "interindustry wage spread [in Germany]
is low by international standards."'" The second format involves a
framework of worker representation established by law in which workers'
representatives consult with plant and company officials and participate
in important decisions affecting the company.'85 The works councils
negotiate with company officials at the plant level about implementing
the union agreement. This system of worker representation is formally
separate from the union and its representational functions. Both the union
representation of workers at the national or regional level and the local
182. See id. at 178.
183. See id. at 172.
184. Wolfgang Streeck, Successful Adjustment to Turbulent Markets: The Automobile Industry,
in INDUSTRY AND POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY 113, 125-27 (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1989).
185. See Fuerstenberg, supra note 173, at 172 (discussing the dual structure of German
industrial relations); Streeck, supra note 184, at 127 (discussing rights of works councils). An outline
of the postwar law and politics of Geman labor relations can be found, inter alia, in Alan Hyde, A
Theory of Labor Legislation, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 383, 407-12 (1990).
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works councils which administer the union-negotiated agreement provide
both checks and reinforcements for one another.
2. Sweden
a. Economy-wide Bargaining
In Sweden, the LO bargains over wages for substantially all blue-
collar workers with the SAF, an association of all private-sector
employers.' Nationwide labor agreements, such as those between the
LO and the SAF, are known as "central agreements."'87 General pay
increases were periodically negotiated over one to three year terms
between the LO and the SAF from the 1950s to the mid 1980s. 188
Because the bargaining between the LO and the SAF is over a
nationwide agreement extending across all industries, the bargaining is
less affected by concerns central to a specific industry than is the
bargaining conducted by an industrial union in the United States.
Moreover, the broad, almost economy-wide membership of the LO
ensures--even more than in Germany--that the perspectives of the union
and its officials are also economy-wide. Similarly, on the other side of
the bargaining table, because the membership of the employers'
association consists of most private-sector manufacturing firms, that
association is also likely to approach bargaining issues with an economy-
wide perspective.'89 As discussed below, Mancur Olson has suggested
that both the LO and the SAF come close to meeting his definition of
encompassing organizations, organizations whose interests approach the
interests of the general public. 9 '
The tendency of economy-wide bargaining, unless modified by local
negotiation, is to impose standard wage increases (in percentage terms or
in absolute amounts) across all industries. Thus it avoids the effects of
transforming the production efficiencies of profitable industries into
differentially high labor costs, an effect which has characterized wage
bargaining in the United States. These leveling tendencies of centralized
bargaining have been reinforced by the "solidaristic wage policy"
186. See Flanagan, supra note 90, at 129; Hammarstrdm, supra note 43, at 192. On aspects of
Swedish labor law forming the background to bargaining practices, see Hyde, supra note 185, at
418-21.
187. See Hammarstrdrr, supra note 43, at 194.
188. See id. at 194-95.
189. See id. at 191-93.
190. See infra text accompanying note 277.
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pursued by the LO since the 1950s, a policy consciously designed to
shrink differences in compensation among blue-collar workers."'
Despite the attempts of the LO and the SAF to deal on an economy-wide
basis with wage increases, Sweden has experienced substantial "wage
drift," that is, wage increases implemented in particular firms or
industries induced by labor shortages. 2 Wage drift, of course, offsets
the solidaristic goals and has become increasingly important over time,
accounting for fifty percent or more of negotiated wage increases in the
late 1970s and early 1980s."
b. The Aukrust/EFO Bargaining Model
Consistent with a bargaining structure which places a high value
upon economy-wide concerns, production costs, and the productivity of
the export sector were accepted by both sides as prime constraints in
bargaining. 4 Indeed, Swedish collective bargaining appears to have
followed a theoretical format articulated by the Norwegian economist
Odd Aukrust, with modifications developed by three Swedish econo-
mists: Gtsta Edgren, Karl-Olof Faxrn, and Clas-Erik Odhner (the
"Aukrust/EFO model"). 5 The Aukrust/EFO model is discussed
below. 6 According to Robert Flanagan, the Aukrust/EFO model
employed by the LO and the SAF assumed that inflation was a function
of world prices and differences in productivity trends in the tradable and
nontradable goods sectors of the economy-factors for which the LO
bore no responsibility.'97 The wage level would determine profitability
and international competitiveness. Prior to bargaining, the parties would
be able to calculate, from existing trends in world prices and productivi-
ty, the amount of "room" for wage increases consistent with maintaining
the competitiveness of Swedish export industries, a calculation which
191. See Hammarstrdm, supra note 43, at 190.
192. See Flanagan, supra note 90, at 151-53.
193. See id. at 140 (reporting that Swedish unions achieved about one-third of their goal of
narrowing wage differentials in the 1964-1982 period and "the remaining two-thirds [having been]
undone by wage drift"); Hammarstrdm, supra note 43, at 195. Flanagan and others reported earlier,
however, that wage drift exceeded the total of negotiated wage increases from the mid-1950s to
1970. See FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 170, at 313. Thus, the strength of the drift during the 1970-
1982 period appears less than in the preceding 15-year period.
194. See Hammarstrdm, supra note 43, at 194.
195. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
196. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
197. See Flanagan, supra note 90, at 160.
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narrowed the range within which bargaining would occur.'98
Under this model, the government bore the responsibility for the
overall employment level, a responsibility which it met by expanding
public-sector hiring to pick up slack in the labor market. Initially this
public-sector hiring was understood as responding to temporary
maladjustments in the labor market. In retrospect, it is possible that this
government policy had the effect of encouraging the LO to inflate its
wage demands.'99 Flanagan sees a more complex interaction. The
expansion of the public sector increased the role and the aggressiveness
of public-sector unions."' Wage restraint by the LO was discouraged
by rivalry with public-sector unions. The reluctance of the government
(until the mid 1980s) to resist the demands in the public sector exacerbat-
ed the problem.20 ' Ultimately, the maintenance of profitability in the
traded sector itself required a succession of currency devaluations." 2
The Swedish bargaining model finally broke down in the 1980s as a
result of the excessive wage demands which it encouraged. 3
198. See id. The Aukrust/EFO model fits a fixed exchange rate system such as the Bretton
Woods System that prevailed worldwide until 1973; see also MORDEcHAI E. KRENiN, INTERNATION-
AL ECONOMICs: A POLiCY APPROACH 53-56 (5th ed. 1987) (describing the Bretton Woods System).
Under fixed exchange rates, excessive wage increases in the export sector would impair the
marketability of exports when the wage increases were reflected in prices. In Sweden that would
have damaged employment in the pace-setting export industries. Had the LO ignored the constraints
indicated by the Aukrust/EFO model, the Swedish government would have been forced either to
devalue its currency or to tighten its system of exchange controls. When a nation's currency floats
freely, however, excessive wage increases imposed across the entire economy would both engender
inflation and automatically depreciate its currency. The Bretton Woods (fixed-exchange rate) System
collapsed in 1973. See id. at 190-91. Even after that collapse, Sweden tried to maintain a fixed
exchange rate for the Swedish krona. It failed dramatically in the 1981-1982 period, when the krona
was devalued by 24 percent against the currencies of its trading partners. See Bosworth & Lawrence,
supra note 90, at 98. Again in 1992, Sweden had to abandon a peg of the krona to the European
Currency Unit. See Janet Bush, Euro-lessonsfrom Sweden, TIMES (London), Apr. 30, 1996, at 29.
199. See Flanagan, supra note 90, at 161.
200. Public sector share of total employment expanded significantly during the 1970s. See
LINDBECK, supra note 40, at 145-47 (discussing Swedish economic policy). Public sector
employment grew from approximately 21 percent of total employment in 1970 to 28 percent in1978.
See id. at 143-44 & fig.8.4. The increasing importance of the public sector was also reflected in the
amount of the GNP which it represented. In 1980 the government share of Swedish GNP was 64
percent. See FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 170, at 316 ("[T]ax revenue increased from 40.5 percent
of GNP in 1970 to 53.4 percent in 1977; Sweden became the only OECD country in which the tax
burden exceeded half of GNP."). Not only did this growth of the public sector strain Sweden's
resources and foster an aggressive public sector unionism, but it also created a severe tax crunch
which exacerbated the collective bargaining problem. New money wage income gained at the
bargaining table became subject to steep income taxes and value-added taxes. See id.
201. See Flanagan, supra note 90, at 163.
202. See id. at 161.
203. See id. at 164-65.
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Despite its ultimate failure, there are positive aspects of the Swedish
model of labor relations. When the LO, representing all blue-collar
workers, bargains with the SAF, representing all private-sector employ-
ers, economy-wide interests are reflected on both sides of the bargaining
table. During the 1950s and 1960s, the LO exercised restraint in its
bargaining demands in the interests of ensuring international competitive-
ness. The practice of setting wage increases as percentages or absolute
amounts applicable across the economy both furthered the LO's
solidaristic wage policy as well as avoided the problem of imposing
differentially high labor costs upon the nation's most profitable
industries. In short, Swedish bargaining practices initially fostered
exports.
c. The Breakdown of the Swedish Bargaining Model
Flanagan's analysis attributes the ultimate breakdown of the Swedish
model to the LO's failure to be sufficiently encompassing in its
membership. According to Flanagan, the model collapsed because of
inter-union rivalries, each union being more concerned with advancing
the interests of its members than with the social consequences of
excessive wage demands.2" Even the LO, which represented all blue-
collar workers, could not maintain a policy of restraint in the face of the
aggressive demands of the public-sector unions."' Once the public-
sector unions began to compete with the LO to see who could obtain the
largest wage increase, all of the unions confronted, as Flanagan puts it,
a prisoner's dilemma."6 No union can afford to follow a policy of
restraint when the other unions will, in effect, free-ride off of its restraint.
Had the LO represented all public workers as well as the private-sector,
blue-collar workers, it would have been able to follow a policy of
restraint, benefiting the working class as a whole.
The models of labor relations which emerged in Germany and
Sweden are now threatened from another direction: the drive towards a
single European market. The new all-European market environment,
besides providing employers with the enlarged market which facilitates
scale economies in production, erodes the power of labor unions which
previously controlled the available labor supply. That labor union power
is being eroded by the enhanced intra-European competition to which
204. See id. at 162-63.
205. See id. at 163.
206. See id.
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employers are becoming increasingly exposed and by the increasingly
available opportunities of employers to expand (or move) their operations
elsewhere within the European Union." 7
C. Japan
1. Background and Union Structure
Japanese labor law dates from the period of the American occupa-
tion in the years immediately following World War II. The Trade Union
law was enacted shortly after the end of the war and was substantially
amended in 1949.' Contrary to American law, Japanese law contains
no requirement that any one union be the exclusive representative of the
workers in a bargaining unit. 9 In this, Japanese law and practice
thereunder resembles France, where several unions can actively represent
workers at the same factory."' Also contrary to the American practice
of union organization by industry or the German/Scandinavian practice
of meta-industry organization, Japanese unions are all enterprise (or
"company") unions."' These enterprise unions appear to possess less
power than the major American or European unions have traditionally
possessed.212 This is partially because of the enterprise base of organi-
zation. Since no union controls any of the labor supply beyond the
particular enterprise where its members are employed, employers who
should be faced with a prolonged strike would be able to replace the
strikers,"1 a practice unavailable to employers in many nations and,
until the mid-1980s, not widely used in the United States.214 Strikes,
therefore, are generally limited in time. During the period in which
207. See Melvin Reder & Lloyd Ulman, Unionism and Unification, in LABOR AND AN
INTEGRATED EUROPE, supra note 112, at 13, 38-39.
208. See WiLLaiA B. GOULD, JAPAN'S RESHAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 23,30 (1984);
see also SHIGro TSURU, JAPAN'S CAPITALISM: CREATIWE DEFEAT AND BEYOND 23 (1993) (noting
that authorities of the American occupation "pressed the Japanese government to legislate the Trade
Union Law").
209. See GOULD, supra note 208, at 37.
210. See Janine Goetschy & Jacques Rojot, French Industrial Relations, in INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra note 43, at 142, 146-49.
211. Most of the Japanese enterprise unions are affiliated with a national federation, the
principal ones of which are the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo) and the Japanese
Confederation of Labor (DomeO. See GOULD, supra note 208, at 7.
212. See id. at 8-9.
213. See id. at 143.
214. The NLRA permits employers to replace striking workers. Employers generally had not
made significant use of that right until after President Reagan provided the example of replacing the
striking air controllers in the PATCO strike. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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bargaining takes place over new labor contracts, unions sometimes call
strikes for periods ranging from one-half of a day to one day."'
Union organization around particular enterprises means that Japanese
industrial relations have no analogues to either the American craft union
or to a "bargaining unit" smaller than the enterprise itself. Thus, within
enterprise unions workers are not segregated or classified by skill or job,
and hence are free to be reassigned, transferred, or to have their tasks
modified at the discretion of the company."6 Work rules, which have
limited the authority of management to reassign worker tasks, are thus
largely absent in Japanese factories.
2. Wage Determinations
Wage agreements are generally for a one-year duration. Wage
negotiations at all companies are conducted at the same time, in the
spring of each year, during the Spring Offensive." 7 Generally, an
overall norm for wage increases in all industries is worked out over the
months preceding the signing of the new agreements. This process
involves the government, the leading figures from industry and banking,
academics, and the union federations participating in an extended public
discussion and debate."8 Ronald Dore, who has described this process,
attributes its success, inter alia, to a "high level of macro-economic
sophistication" among union leaders and to the fact that the enterprise
unions "acknowledge their stake in the success of their firm."2 9 Indeed,
NLRB Chairman William Gould has reported that the Japanese enterprise
unions are so company-conscious that, in one year, only five percent
engaged in negotiations in which union officials from outside of the
company participated. 2
215. See Tadashi Hanami, ConflictResolution in Industrial Relations, in CONFLICT RESOLUTION
IN MARKET ECONOMmS 203,210-11 & tbl.4 (Tadashi Hanami &Roger Blanpain eds., 2d ed. 1989);
see also GOULD, supra note 208, at 13 (stating that strikes in Japan are "of relatively brief
duration").
216. See GOULD, supra note 208, at 3; see also DORE, supra note 102, at 92 (stating that a
worker in a Japanese firm "defines himself primarily as a member of that firm, not as a member of
an occupation group").
217. See DORE, supra note 102, at 24-25; GOULD, supra note 208, at 7.
218. See DoRE, supra note 102, at 25.
219. Id.
220. See GOULD, supra note 208, at 6.
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3. The Bonus System
The wages negotiated in the spring constitute only about sixty-five
percent of workers' total compensation." The remainder is paid in
bonuses and overtime, a practice which has interested a number of
commentators because of the unusual flexibility it provides to employers
to adjust worker compensation. Thus, according to Gould, because of the
high percentage of wages paid in the form of bonuses, "wages can swing
up or down as much as 30 percent a year."' Dore, writing about the
1970-1980 period, however, cautions that bonus payments are less
flexible than they appear on the surface. They are "sticky downwards"
Dore asserts.m Martin Weitzman, while conceding that rigidities may
affect downward flexibility, contends that the bonus system provides
Japanese employers "with an important means of reducing labor costs
during recessions." 4 Whatever degree of stickiness impedes employers
from adjusting bonuses downward, the bonus system necessarily
introduces a second decisional point into the determination of increases
in employee compensation. Thus, the bonuses are agreed upon separately
from increases in the overall wage rate, which is fixed in the Spring
Offensive. (Bonuses are negotiated in an "Autumn Offensive.")' First,
the Spring Offensive sets upper limits on wage increases across the entire
economy. Second, the bonus system minimally permits particular
enterprises to hold bonuses constant, thereby reducing compensation
increases in those enterprises by up to one third less than the economy-
wide norm. Third, the bonus system, despite its stickiness, does
apparently permit downward adjustments, at least more readily than
downward adjustments in wages proper.
4. "Permanent' Employment
Japanese industry is well-known for the practice of life time
employment. Yet this practice is found primarily among the so-called
"permanent" employment in the large firms.' Japanese manufacturers
tend to outsource substantially more than has traditionally been the
practice at many American firms. The result is that suppliers and their
221. See id. at 7.
222. Id.
223. DoRE, supra note 102, at 103.
224. WmITzMAN, supra note 34, at 75.
225. See DORE, supra note 102, at 103.
226. See GOULD, supra note 208, at 10-11.
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employees bear a major portion of the burden of economic down-
turns. 7 Thus, the Japanese economy has been described as a two-
tiered. On the top tier are the large companies, providing "permanent"
employment to their workers, almost all of whom are represented by
enterprise unions. But on the lower tier, accounting for about eighty
percent of the labor force, are temporary workers and employees of
subcontractors, many of whom are not represented by unions.2 8
Within the upper tier, the institution of "permanent" employment
provides advantages to employers as well as to the favored class of
workers. First, it enables employers to respond flexibly to change.
Because the "permanent" employees of large firms possess employment
security, they need not fear the adoption of new technology and so do
not resist it.' 9 Second, the institution of permanent employment aids
management in acquiring useful information from workers; thus, workers
need not be reluctant to disclose more efficient methods for performing
their tasks, for fear of losing their jobs." ° Third, the institution of
permanent employment transforms substantial amounts of labor cost into
fixed cost, thus enhancing employers' abilities to respond aggressively
to declines in demand. Fourth, the institution of permanent employment
reinforces the flexibility of management to reassign workers to tasks as
the needs of the moment demand, since permanent workers need not rely
upon work rules or job descriptions as protections against layoffs. Fifth,
combined with the bonus system, the institution of permanent employ-
ment helps to generate employee loyalty, willingness to contribute ideas
and information for improving production or product quality generated
on the plant floor, and acceptance of extensive discretion by management
to redefine and reassign tasks.
The Japanese system of industrial relations thus possesses a
significant number of positive aspects. First, the economy-wide wage
determination in the spring of each year means that industry-specific
productivity gains are not transformed into differentially high labor costs,
thus disadvantaging those industries in international trade. Second, the
practice of setting wages annually enables both industry and labor to
227. See id. at 10; Vai Io Lo, Atypical Employment: A Comparison of Japan and the United
States, 17 COMP. LAB. LU. 492, 496 (1996).
228. See GOULD, supra note 208, at 9; Joan Vogel, Manufacturing Solidarity: Adventure
Training for Managers, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 657, 668 n.70 (1991).
229. See GOULD, supra note 208, at 11-12 (discussing the role of joint consultation in the
handling of technology transfers).
230. See id. at 95; see also Summers, supra note 158, at 475 (discussing the role of quality
circles and methods of employee input in decisions concerning the enterprise).
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adjust to fluctuations in demand and cost. Third, the system of substantial
worker bonuses helps to cushion sector-specific shocks. Fourth, the bonus
system helps workers to identify with their employer and to cooperate in
efforts to increase profitability. Fifth, the permanent employment system
also engenders loyalty by workers to their company, encourages their
participation in generating incremental advances in workplace efficiency,
and removes their opposition to the implementation of new technologies.
Sixth, the general absence of work rules provides a context in which
permanent employment and worker identification with their company can
foster worker cooperation in continuous efforts to increase efficiency.
Seventh, the extensive use of outsourcing enables large employers to cast
much of the burden of downturns on their suppliers and the labor forces
of the suppliers. Eighth, the permanent employment system converts
wages from a variable to a fixed cost, thus facilitating the company's
ability to adjust to unfavorable economic conditions in the markets in
which it competes. To the extent that the bonus system allows downward
adjustments, Japanese employers gain an additional element of flexibility
in the markets in which they compete.
V. MODELS OF LABOR RELATIONS
From these broad sketches of labor laws and practices in the United
States, Germany and Sweden, and Japan it is possible to construct three
ideal types or models of industrial relations which this Author calls,
respectively, the U.S. model, the German/Scandinavian model, and the
Japanese model.
A. The U.S. Model
Because all unions seek higher wages and other forms of compensa-
tion, slight but significant differences in union objectives are not always
immediately apparent to nonparticipant observers. In the U.S. model,
industry-wide unions negotiate with employers over the wage rate, with
the objective of transforming industry profits into higher wages for
workers in that industry."' Thus, contrary to the German/Scandinavian
and Japanese practices, bargaining in the United States generally focuses
upon the industry. Wage increases are likely to be higher in the more
profitable industries than in the less profitable industries. Wage increases
thus always transform some actual or potential profits into higher labor
231. See Gifford, supra note 14, at 1423.
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costs. When wage increases are contained within the limits of productivi-
ty advances, then only potential profits are transformed into labor
costs. 2 When wage increases exceed the extent of productivity
advances, as they did in the 1970s, then part of the previously realized
earning power of the industry is permanently transformed into labor
costs. 3
Although workers naturally wish to share in the success of their
company, the traditional method for doing so, i.e., through increases in
their hourly wage rates, has a number of disadvantages. First, it is
extremely difficult to reverse wage increases. Should the economic
fortunes of a once successful employer (or an industry) decline, the
employer (or industry) is saddled with labor costs which are unduly high
and difficult to modify. The wage rate is not generally modified in
economic downturns and is extremely sticky downwards, even in
structurally depressed industries. Second, the almost universal practice in
the United States is for employers to adjust to economic downturns with
layoffs rather than with reductions in wages. 4 This practice of laying
off workers is the necessary consequence of the downward stickiness of
wages. The result of these practices is that companies are impeded in
adjusting their operations to economic downturns or falling demand.
Third, another almost universal practice in the United States is for
workers to be laid off in reverse order of seniority." The worker last
hired is the first to be laid off when adjustments are required in the labor
market.
On the labor side, the current practice of adjusting to economic
downturns through layoffs, rather than through downward adjustments in
compensation, affects different classes of workers differently, and this
inherent conflict of interest among workers is exacerbated by the
seniority system. The interests of the mass of workers who possess
greater seniority and who do not fear layoffs clash with the interests of
the smaller number of workers who possess lesser seniority and who are
laid off in a downturn. Fourth, this inherent conflict of interest which the
seniority system generates in the situation of layoffs is replicated when
a union chooses a bargaining strategy which implicates the
232. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 58, at 433.
233. See id. at 434.
234. See WErrZMAN, supra note 34, at 3-4.
235. See, e.g., James A. Craft, Equal Opportunity and Seniority: Trends and Manpower
Implications, 26 LAB. L.J. 750, 752 (1975); Helen Elkiss, Modifying Seniority Systems Which
Perpetuate Past Discrimination, 31 LAB. Li. 37, 37 (1980).
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wage/employment tradeoff. The mass of workers with the greatest
seniority will always opt for a strategy which weighs wage increases
greater than concerns about reduced employment. Thus, when dealing
with a wage/employment tradeoff, union bargaining strategy-insofar as
it reflects the preferences of the employed workforce who make up the
bulk of its membership-will be skewed in favor of a higher wage goal
and will be less concerned with any resulting adverse impact on
employment.
When the U.S. economy operated in a largely insular fashion, the
U.S. bargaining model produced high wages in the auto and steel
oligopolies, wages which increased significantly over time."s And the
auto and steel companies passed on much of these periodic wage
increases in the form of higher prices for their output. Because the
employers were themselves oligopolists, the result in prices and output
incorporated the double-monopoly effect. The economic consequence of
the union's control over the industry-specific labor supply was added to
the existing oligopoly power of the auto and steel producers. As pointed
out above, in such a situation the public loses, but so do the producers
and the input suppliers because their returns are less than they could
be. 37
It is here that the peculiar organization of an American industrial
labor union is of special interest. In any other case, an input supplier and
a final product producer who each possessed market power would find
a way to avoid the double-monopoly effect. Business firms would be
impelled to avoid the double-monopoly effect insofar as they were
pursuing profit-maximizing objectives, since by avoiding that effect their
profits could be increased. The objectives of an American industrial
union, however, are not easily specified. Because a labor union is not a
business, it does not seek profits as such. It does seek the economic
betterment of its members. But it may not be possible to specify its goals
with more precision. And when confronted with the wage/employment
tradeoff, this lack of goal specificity means that its strategy will be
indeterminate.
The seniority system is likely to affect the bargaining strategy of
236. Even after those industries were subjected to significant foreign competition, voluntary
restraint agreements and other forms of protection enabled wage bargaining to ignore product market
restraints to a significant degree. Protection over steel lasted for approximately a twenty-three year
period and protection of automobiles lasted for eleven years. See Daniel J. Gifford, Antitrust and
Trade Issues: Similarities, Differences, and Relationships, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1049,1076-78 (1995).
237. See supra text accompanying note 56.
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every union. As noted above, the seniority system is likely to skew union
decision-making towards a heavier weighing of higher wages when
decisions about the wage/employment tradeoff have to be made.28 In
addition, the seniority system is likely to generate union disinterest in
avoiding the double-monopoly effect, because the vested interests of the
most senior workers-those likely to be most influential in union
decision-making-would be undermined by any agreement which traded
off compensation for employment. This analysis suggests that most
American industrial unions lack interest in advancing the overall interests
of the working class by seeking a wage/employment tradeoff which
maximizes the overall return to labor. Rather, industrial unions in the
United States lack any underlying ideology. They, like other interest
groups, aggressively assert the short-run interests of their most powerful
class of members.
Since the 1970s basic industry in the United States has been
increasingly subject to international competition.29 Wage rates which
were set in a context in which employers were domestic oligopolists have
handicapped these companies in competing with foreign rivals. Taking
the U.S. automobile industry as an example, Japanese Professor Junichi
Goto has shown how the results of collective bargaining agreements in
that industry have imposed a substantial disadvantage on the U.S.
producers vis-i-vis their Japanese rivals.'t Goto points out that it is not
just that U.S. auto workers earn high wages that is the source of the
difficulty, because the effects (for purposes of international trade) of
generally high U.S. wage rates would be washed out in the currency
markets. Rather, as Goto states, it is the fact that U.S. auto workers are
paid significantly more than U.S. workers in manufacturing generally.24'
This, of course, is the direct result of industrial unions seeking industry-
specific goals, pressuring up wages in the most profitable industries. By
contrast, Japanese auto workers do not enjoy a comparable wage
differential over Japanese workers in manufacturing generally.24 Thus,
the differentially higher labor costs borne by U.S. auto manufacturers vis-
d-vis their Japanese rivals means that the U.S. manufacturers are
238. See supra text accompanying notes 234-35.
239. See Gifford, supra note 14, at 1403.
240. See GoTO, supra note 27, at 59-61, 135-36 (identifying the impact of the differentials
between auto-worker wages and general manufacturing worker wages in the United States and
Japan).
241. See id. at 61.
242. See id. at 64.
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burdened with a handicap which will not be washed out in the currency
markets.
This kind of a labor-cost handicap is not easily overcome. Wages,
as noted above, are not adjustable downwards, except in extreme
circumstances. The industry-specific wage differential is, to a significant
extent, the consequence of collective bargaining by industry. When the
practice of conducting wage bargaining by industry-specific unions
originated in the 1930s and 1940s, international competition was not
important. The effects of that practice have continued, however, into an
era when international competition has increased in importance.
Finally, the tradition of labor relations in the United States has been
an adversarial one. Unions have traditionally sought their own goals of
increased wages and benefits with little concern about the employer's
day-to-day efficiency. Work rules have been a source of inefficiency,
especially when technology changes. The employer's profitability was
relevant only as an occasion for seeking increased compensation. The
adversarial climate has discouraged workers from offering ideas or
suggestions for improving product quality or production efficiency.
Today, this long-standing adversarial climate impedes the abilities of U.S.
employers to adjust to international competition and impedes employers
and unions from restructuring their relations along more cooperative
lines. Indeed, the NLRA itself assumes an adversarial format for labor
relations and contains a number of provisions reinforcing those assump-
tions."'
Because the U.S. model is premised upon unions exerting power in
the labor market to pressure wages upwards and employers passing on
their higher labor costs in higher prices, unions would be expected to
oppose international agreements, such as NAFTA and the WTO, which
would interfere with this scenario by exposing employers to heightened
competition from abroad.'" Yet, as pointed out below, the Ger-
man/Scandinavian model and the Japanese model of labor relations are
more compatible with international trade.24 In short, the U.S. model of
labor relations is a creature of an earlier era. It bears characteristics
which are ill-adapted to a period of intense international competition.
Moreover, the organizational structure of industrial unions and the
243. See National Labor Relations Act §§ 1-2, 7-10, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-152, 157-158, 159-160
(1994).
244. See Frederick M. Abbott, Foundation-Building for Western Hemispheric Integration, 17
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 900, 916 (1996-1997).
245. See infra notes 260-64 and accompanying text.
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universal custom of seniority make reform difficult.
B. The German/Scandinavian Model
The industrial-relations practices of Germany and Scandinavia
suggest a model of labor relations in which a large union representing
blue-collar workers in all, or most, manufacturing industries bargains
with an association whose membership includes most manufacturers. As
noted previously, in such a bargaining context, both sides are necessarily
concerned with economic effects extending beyond those affecting a
particular industry.2' In such a model, bargaining would tend to focus
upon a range for economy-wide wage increases, exerting less of a
disparate impact upon wages (and hence upon labor costs) among the
various industries than does the U.S. model. This model drawn from the
salient features of German and Scandinavian practice would also
incorporate the German practice of widespread worker participation in
governance, including works councils, matters which will be discussed
after consideration of the Japanese model.
The LO in Sweden has reinforced the compressing effect that
economy-wide bargaining would be likely to exert on wage increases
across industries with its solidaristic wage policy, a policy explicitly
designed to narrow wage differences among blue-collar workers.247
Despite countervailing tendencies expressed in so-called wage drift, the
LO appears to have been partially successful in containing pressures
towards wage disparity. In Germany, where IG Metall bargains for most
workers in the manufacturing sector, wage spread among industries has
been unusually low.248 Thus, to a significant extent, actual results
follow those indicated by the model.
The crisis in Swedish labor relations which emerged in the 1980s
was apparently due to the abandonment of the Aukrust format for
negotiation when inter-union rivalries effectively forced the LO to assert
excessive wage demands.249 The labor-relations model suggested by the
German/Scandinavian practice, however, is one in which a single union
bargains on behalf of most workers. The breakdown of the Swedish
practice can thus be attributed to the divergence of the actual practice in
246. See supra text accompanying notes 194-98.
247. See Flanagan, supra note 90, at 132-33 (noting that most of the reductions in wage
dispersion for blue-collar workers is due to Sweden's solidaristic wage policy).
248. See Streeck, supra note 184, at 125.
249. See Flanagan, supra note 90, at 161-63, 165.
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Sweden from the logic of the model. In the model, a comprehensive
union representing all workers would have foreclosed the possibility of
inter-union rivalries.
C. The Japanese Model
Japanese industrial relations suggests a model which is significantly
more paternalistic than the German/Scandinavian model. While in the
German/Scandinavian model a single union representing all workers
possesses sufficient power to countervail the employers' associations, the
model drawn from Japanese experience is one in which an array of
nonexclusive enterprise (or company) unions deal separately with each
employer." This is a situation in which the power relationship is
heavily weighted in favor of the employers.
In the Japanese model, twenty percent of the work force has
permanent employment, in the sense that these workers are relatively
secure against layoffs." The result is that workers are willing to
cooperate with management in accepting new technology and in
contributing insights from the plant floor on product quality and
production efficiency.
Wage increases in this model are determined, within a narrow range
and for all industries, in a process of public dialogue involving govern-
ment, academics, members of the public and workers. 2 This method
of determining wage increases helps to narrow differentials among
industries and incorporates into the process economy-wide considerations.
Thus, the Japanese model uses a different method to replicate the results
of the German/Scandinavian model in broadening the focus of wage
determinations to include economy-wide factors.
Finally, in the Japanese model, wages represent only a part of
workers' overall compensation. The remainder-amounting to thirty-five
percent of the total-takes the form of bonuses, the amount of which
depends upon the company's profits. 3 Prescinding from any downward
stickiness affecting actual bonus payments in Japan, the model assumes
that bonuses are freely adjusted up or down depending upon the
company's success in the market. 4 Under the Japanese model, workers
250. See GOTO, supra note 27, at 65.
251. See GOULD, supra note 208, at 9-10.
252. See supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.




truly share in the company's profits and thus the company's fortunes. In
conjunction with the security offered by permanent employment, this
economic participation in their employer's success helps to reinforce
workers' identification with their employer and encourages active
attempts to increase efficiency.
Under the Japanese model profitable industries are not burdened
with excessive labor costs; in this model unions do not pressure wage
rates upwards in successful industries to transform profits into hourly
wage rates. Rather wage rates are set on an economy-wide basis as they
are under the German/Scandinavian model. But workers nonetheless
share in the particular profitability of their employer as they do in the
U.S. model. 5 Thus, the Japanese model, in this respect, appears to
possess the advantages of both the German/Scandinavian model and the
U.S. model while avoiding their respective disadvantages.
VI. COMPETITIVE CONSTRAINTS ON WAGE DETERMINATIONS
In the Aukrust bargaining format originally followed by the LO,
industries are visualized as belonging either to an "exposed" sector
dealing in tradable goods and services or to a "sheltered" sector dealing
in so-called nontradables, i.e., goods and services which are not exposed
to international competition. 6 In Scandinavia, the "exposed" sector is
composed primarily of the export industries. 7 These industries sell in
internationally competitive markets where they are "price-takers" and so
are constrained in the amounts which they can pay in wages and remain
competitive."5 As noted above, the LO tried to determine how much
"room" was available in these industries for wage increases---the room
for wage increases being determined by increases in productivity in
Swedish factories and the internationally competitive price levels which
set a ceiling on the prices which Swedish exports could command. 9
The LO strategy then was to seek an across-all-industries wage
increase of a percentage amount which was within the capacity of the
export industries to pay without losing their international competitive-
ness."' This strategy thus sought to impose upon the sheltered indus-
tries a percentage wage increase whose amount was set without reference
255. See Summers, supra note 158, at 475.
256. See EDGRE, ET AL., supra note 49, at 70-71.
257. See Aukrust, supra note 49, at 109-10.
258. See id. at 113.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 109-10.
260. See Aukrust, supra note 49, at 113.
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to the conditions of the sheltered industries. Indeed, the export industries
were generally more efficient than the sheltered industries, and so (at
constant world prices) had more "room"' for wage increases."' The
sheltered industries, however, were presumed to price their goods and
services on a mark-up basis. 62 Under this assumption, the sheltered
industries would essentially pass on labor-cost increases to the public.
Insofar as the demand for the goods and services of the sheltered
industries limited their ability to pass on higher costs or forced reductions
in output, the LO saw this effect as conducive to the expansion of the
more efficient export industries, industries which (under this format) were
the pace-setters for wage increases.263 Similarly, in Germany, when IG
Metall seeks wage increases in meta-industry bargaining, it also must
consider competitive constraints upon employers. Germany is both an
unusually large exporter and importer, and hence (in terms of the
Aukrust model associated with Scandinavian negotiations) has a large
exposed sector which is constrained by international competition. Again,
the society-wide attention to across-the-board wage increases in Japan
similarly ensures that competitive considerations for Japan's important
export industries are taken into account in wage determinations. Indeed,
as noted above, Professor Goto has identified the narrow wage differen-
tial among Japanese industries as a significant competitive advantage
which the Japanese auto companies possess in their export trade vis-a-vis
their U.S. competitors.2"
By contrast, wage negotiations in the United States have not focused
upon international competition as a constraint upon wage increases. 5
Under the U.S. model, employers pass on all or much of higher labor
costs which result from bargaining. Auto, steel, and other mass produc-
tion industries are oligopolies with the power to set prices. 6 And even
competitively structured industries have sold either nontradables (such as
construction) or have enjoyed extensive protection (like textiles under the
Multi-Fiber Agreement2 7 and its predecessors).268 In terms of the
261. See id. at 112.
262. See id. at 110-I1.
263. See id. at 113-14.
264. See GOTo, supra note 27, at 61.
265. The United States has traditionally been the leading example of a large industrial nation
in which foreign trade has not exerted a major effect. See EDGREN ET AL., supra note 49, at 70.
266. See Adams & Brock, The Automobile Industry, in THE STRucrURE oF AMERICAN
INDusTRY 132 (,V. Adams ed., 7th ed. 1986).
267. See Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20, 1973,25 U.S.T. 1001.
19971
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
Aukrust format, all American employers bargained as if dealing in
nontradables, a situation which, until the last two decades, was largely
true.
269
In the auto industry, for example, only an insignificant portion of
North American production has been exported outside of North
America,270 with U.S. manufacturers generally producing for foreign
markets in foreign plants. Throughout the post-World War I period into
the 1990s, the UAW had assumed that the automobile industry is an
oligopoly in which employers are able to pass along substantial amounts
of any increased labor costs in final-product prices. Even when Japanese
competition became severe in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the
response of the union and most of the auto companies was to call for
protection.27 When the government finally negotiated a voluntary
restraint agreement ("VRA") with the Japanese, the result was the
preservation of the domestic oligopoly of the big three, but with the
Japanese producers admitted to a cartel-like arrangement established
through the VRA.272 The VRA relieved the pressure on the U.S.
manufacturers to control their wage costs.2 3 Indeed, after the Plaza
Agreement in the mid-1980s (which effectively revalued the dollar
downwards against the yen and thereby increased the dollar-measured
costs of the Japanese companies), the U.S. producers took advantage of
the higher costs of the Japanese companies by increasing their own
prices." Thus, they confirmed by their behavior the continuance of
oligopolistic pricing in the domestic auto market and facilitated the
continuance of the traditional collective bargaining assumptions. The
expiration of the VRA in 1992,275 the downsizing of General Motors,
and the growing practice of outsourcing in the auto industry are all signs,
however, that the days of the traditional U.S. model are numbered. The
successful resistance of Caterpillar, Inc., a large exporter, to the UAW's
attempt to impose a wage structure based upon the John Deere pattern
268. See Long-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles, openedfor
signature Oct. 1, 1962, 13 U.S.T. 2672.
269. See Aukrust, supra note 49, at 147-48.
270. See GOTO, supra note 27, at 37.
271. See id. at 40.
272. See id. at 155-57 (referring to VRAs as voluntary export restraints "VERs").
273. The VRA also preserved domestic auto employment against erosion, but at a strikingly
high cost to U.S. consumers. Goto estimates the cost per job saved to have been $126,050 per year.
See GOTO, supra note 27, at 163.
274. See Gifford, supra note 236, at 1077.
275. See WiLLIAM T. HOGAN, S.J., GLOBAL STEEL IN THE 1990s 146 (1991).
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suggests that international competitive constraints are beginning to be felt
in some areas of domestic bargaining. 76
VII. THE REFORM OF THE U.S. MODEL
The U.S. model of labor relations is especially vulnerable to
international competition. It assumes that employers are able to pass on
higher labor costs in the prices of final products. When international
competition impedes employers from passing on higher costs, then the
model breaks down. Yet the demise of this model of labor relations does
not necessarily portend the end of the labor movement nor a bleak future
for workers generally. Both the German/Scandinavian model and the
Japanese model provide useful points of reference for redesigning U.S.
labor relations. The German/Scandinavian model incorporates Mancur
Olson's "encompassing" organization concept and so provides the most
obvious vehicle through which institutional design would bring about a
closer match between the perspectives and objectives of organized labor
on one hand and the pursuit of aggregate societal welfare on the
other. 7 But that model also has critical deficiencies disqualifying it as
a pattern for American reform. First, the German/Scandinavian model
confers immense power on the encompassing labor organization-more
power than the American public would probably tolerate in a private
organization.27 Second, with union membership declining substantially
in the United States and currently running at approximately ten percent
of the workforce, there is no foreseeable prospect whatsoever for the
emergence of an encompassing labor organization in the United
States. 9 Like the German/Scandinavian model, the Japanese model can
be the source of valuable insights for U.S. labor law reform, but the
heavily paternalistic elements incorporated in the Japanese model
preclude its being carried over bodily to the American context.
276. See William R. Corbett, A Proposal for Procedural Limitations on Hiring Permanent
Striker Replacements: "A Far, Far Better Thing" than the Workplace Fairness Act, 72N.C. L. REv.
813, 819-24 (1994).
277. See OLSON, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 33, at 47-53.
278. See id. at 90-93.
279. See 1996 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 26, at 436 tbl.681.
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A. Insights for Reform Provided by the
German/Scandinavian Model
Although reform in the United States is unlikely to employ the
device of an encompassing labor organization along German/Scandina-
vian lines, some of the socially positive aspects of that model may be
achievable by alternate means. Before mapping out these alternate means,
let us first identify the positive aspects of the German/Scandinavian
model.
1. The Positive Aspects of Meta-Industrial Organization
As noted, the meta-industry or encompassing structure of organized
labor under the German/Scandinavian model fosters labor union
perspectives which are broader than those of an industrial union in the
United States and objectives which coincide more closely to the
aggregate welfare of society."' This is Mancur Olson's point about the
superiority of encompassing organizations.28 In the labor union context,
the larger the labor organization and the greater its responsibilities, the
less it will focus solely upon conditions within a specific industry to the
exclusion of economy-wide concerns. Indeed, in the extreme case in
which a single labor organization represented all workers, that organiza-
tion would be impelled to consider fully the wage/employment tradeoff,
since nationwide unemployment would be the direct result of its own
bargaining. Such a comprehensive union organization would also be
more likely than the present industrial unions to seek the overall welfare
of the working class. Indeed, its goal in bargaining would tend towards
maximizing the overall return to labor, rather than the welfare of the
most senior workers.
Maximizing labor's return within each industry sounds similar to the
efforts of today's industrial unions to pressure up wages within their
respective industries. Yet such a maximizing goal would provide a
critically different operational modus vivandi. It would mitigate the
contemporary interest conflict between workers of greater and lesser
280. See supra note 277 and accompanying text. The U.S. labor movement-partially due to
the craft-union background from which even its industrial unions have sprung--has almost invariably
been characterized by a narrow vision, one which placed in the foreground the welfare of its
employed members (especially the most senior of the employed members) and which has tended to
avoid responsibility for the unemployed. See OLSON, LOGIC, supra note 33, at 66-67 (recounting the
origin of unions in America).
281. See OLSON, RISE AND DECMINE, supra note 33, at 48-53.
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seniority where benefits to the workers with the greater seniority come
at the expense of those with lesser seniority. Because today's American
unions possess no standard for resolving this inherent conflict, the
tradeoffs they make between higher wages and lower employment
invariably appear arbitrary. The institutional dynamics of an encompass-
ing union, however, would induce pressures upon its leadership to seek
a wage level on the more objective maximization criterion. Moreover, an
encompassing union would bear a responsibility to assist workers
unemployed in one industry to find employment in another. A goal of
maximizing labor's return within each industry would help to engender
a new more cooperative relationship between capital and labor, since the
achievement of this new maximizing goal would require the maximum
degree of production efficiency. Thus, labor's goals on the plant floor
would be substantially identical to those of management. Indeed, this
correspondence of goals would facilitate the introduction of a new regime
of worker participation in workplace governance, along the lines of the
German practice, in which workers' representatives consult with plant
management at the plant level through works councils and in which a
labor representative participates in the deliberations of the company
board.282
A labor union with economy-wide membership seeking to maximize
the return to labor would pursue goals of high compensation and full
employment. Compensation would vary by industry, consistent with the
maximization criterion as applied to each industry. As pointed out below,
maximizing the return to labor in each industry would be facilitated by
a movement towards incorporating bonus or profit-sharing plans as
significant parts of workers' compensation. The macroview which would
be embraced by such a labor union would push the union's objectives
towards ensuring that, over the long run, society's productive resources
were used at their highest potential, thereby ensuring that the labor force
was both fully employed and employed at the highest possible compensa-
tion, consistent with the employment of all others at the highest possible
compensation.
Contrary to the present practice in which an industrial labor union's
strategic decisions implicate Phillips curve considerations, balancing
higher compensation for many against layoffs for a lesser number, an
economy-wide union's efforts to maximize compensation would always
be consistent with full-employment goals, since maximizing the return to
282. See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
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labor would require that workers displaced in one industry would be
hired in the next most rewarding industry. Indeed, the union in such a
setting could be conceived as playing a role analogous to the role played
by the Japanese keiretsu members, who take on the displaced employees
of a downsizing member, thus ensuring that so-called "permanent"
employees are kept permanently on the payrolls.283 Here the union
would facilitate the transfers when necessary. As a result, the level of
employment security of workers generally would be enhanced.
2. A Caveat: The Power of a Comprehensive Organization
Although a comprehensive labor organization of the type described
would represent interests which were close to the interests of the general
public, those interests would not always coincide perfectly. First, is the
question of how much weight is to be afforded the present generation of
workers as against the interests of future generations. The particular way
the actual members of the work force make this balance may not
correspond to the way the larger society performs this balance.'14 A
comprehensive union seeking to maximize the return to labor would be
likely to weigh present compensation greater than company profits, and
thus make demands upon enterprise profits which would be excessive in
the light of the investment necessary to advance living standards over the
long run. Second, a comprehensive union, which adopted socially
suboptimal objectives, would possess immense power to impose them
upon the larger society. Such a union would possess the potential to
paralyze the economy, a power which it would be tempted to use, at least
as a last resort, when industry resisted its demands. 85 Again, such a
comprehensive union would possess a lesser, but no less threatening,
power to impose its objectives: the power to use its control over the
labor force to strategically threaten company-specific or industry-specific
strikes. By coordinating actual or threatened strikes pursuant to an overall
plan, 6 such a comprehensive union could exploit employer vulnerabili-
283. See GOULD, supra note 208, at 10-11.
284. This aspect of a private interest group was noted two centuries ago. See THE FEDERALIST
No. 10 (James Madison).
285. This is the power that Maier identified as the basis for the involvement of European
government in labor affairs during reconstruction from World War I. See MAIER, supra note 3, at
582.
286. Industry-specific unions often employ "whipsaw" tactics in which one producer is
pressured to settle a strike in order to avoid sales diversions to its non-striking rivals. See Gifford,
supra note 14, at 1402-03. A comprehensive union would be able to fashion far more sophisticated
whipsaw-like strategies, involving, for example, the threatened refashioning of customer/supplier
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ties much more extensively than can presently be done by our separate
industry-specific unions.
The societal dangers potentially raised by an encompassing labor
union need not detain us for long, because reform of American labor
relations will not follow the German or Scandinavian path. The share of
the United States economy which is organized is small and diminish-
ing.287 Reform cannot involve universal organization. More likely, it
will take a form which can be implemented incrementally.
B. Insights for Reform Provided by the Japanese Model
The Japanese model combines an economy-wide format for
adjusting hourly compensation with an enterprise focus upon productivity
and bonuses. On the surface, the Japanese approach is superior to the
German/Scandinavian model. First, the economy-wide format for
adjusting basic hourly compensation is superior to that produced by
actual Olsonian encompassing organizations like the Swedish LO and the
German IG Metall, because neither the LO nor IG Metall represents all
-workers."5 Even the LO behaved antisocially when rivalry with public-
sector unions compelled it to make excessive wage demands." 9 Second,
the public dialogue which forms the core of the Spring Offensive is
informed by a comprehensive collection of relevant data supplied at the
beginning of the year by the government.29 Informed public participa-
tion is more likely to push the result of bargaining towards the common
good than two-way bargaining, even between encompassing organiza-
tions, and even when the government participates in the negotiations.
Third, the result which is obtained in the Spring Offensive is less critical
than the results obtained in the bargaining conducted by the LO and IG
Metall, because the one-third of total compensation that takes the form
of bonuses is determined separately.29
In the Japanese model some significant part of worker compensation
is transformed from an inflexible hourly wage format into bonuses. This
is a characteristic meriting imitation. First, because such a bonus system
links in addition to the traditional threat of diverting customers to rival sellers.
287. See 1996 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 26, at 436 tbl.681.
288. See FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 170, at 259 (stating that IG Metall's members are
employees in "the export and import-substitute sectors of the economy"); Flanagan, supra note 90,
at 129 (stating that the LO primarily represents blue-collar workers).
289. See FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 170, at 342-48 (discussing the LO strike of 1980).
290. See DORE, supra note 102, at 24-25.
291. See id. at 103.
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is a highly flexible method for adjusting to economic downturns, layoffs
would no longer become the first response of an enterprise to a fall in
demand. Rather than a situation in which a minority of the work force
suffer a lot, the burden of the downturn would be shared among all of
the enterprise's workforce where the burden incurred per worker would
be less. Second, the bonus system is not merely a method for adjusting
compensation upwards or downwards. It is a means for involving labor
as a partner with employers by directly sharing in the employers' success
in the market. Moreover, it is a method of compensation which probably
best accords with the objective of maximizing labor's overall return.
Indeed, the objection most likely to be raised about such a method of
compensation is that it introduces a factor of uncertainty into worker's
compensation, since workers will not know their total yearly compensa-
tion until their bonuses are calculated.
There are compelling responses to this objection. One, the increased
uncertainty about the exact amount of compensation is offset with
increased employment security, for reasons already mentioned."2 Two,
in the long run, compensation is likely to be greater because the
flexibility of the bonus system enables the employers to respond more
flexibly to market demands, and because the increased identification
which the bonus system engenders between workers and their employers
is likely, in a variety of ways, to increase productivity and hence to
increase enterprise profits which in turn (through the bonus or profit-
sharing arrangements) produce higher compensation. The increased
identification by workers with the enterprise is further reinforced by the
employment security objectives which now become part of the union's
goals.
Finally, the bonus system eliminates once and for all the double
monopoly effect which has produced sub-optimal returns for labor and
capital in some mass production industries and which has burdened the
public with unduly high prices for many years. True, international
competition may effectively erode the double-monopoly effect over the
long run as domestic oligopolies are transformed into international
competitors. But during the period of transition, the double-monopoly
effect impedes the adjustment of domestic firms to the new realities of
global competition. Rather than exerting a restrictive effect on output as
does the double-monopoly effect, the bonus system enhances each firm's
competitive response to market changes because it effectively removes
292. See supra text accompanying notes 221-25.
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labor costs from the computation of variable (and hence marginal)
costs.293 In short, a bonus system, to the extent that it was implemented,
would heighten the competitiveness of business firms, enhance the return
of workers, and assist in providing the public with the benefits of a more
intensely competitive marketplace.
C. The Direction of U.S. Reform
Labor unions are a decreasing presence in the U.S. economy.294
Here, private-sector labor unions are concentrated in the traditional mass-
production industries.2"' The diminishing proportion of these industries
in the U.S. gross domestic product indicates that labor law reform is not
a critical need to this nation.296 Furthermore, despite the many socially
positive characteristics of the German/Scandinavian model, the small
proportion of the private-sector labor force which is unionized means that
reform in the United States will not follow an Olsonian "encompassing"
organization paradigm. Moreover, experience in Sweden suggests that in
practice even meta-industry organization is sometimes insufficient to
generate the public-regarding behavior which theory predicts.297
The Japanese model seems to provide more grist for reform in the
United States. The bonus system, the society-wide dialogue on wage
increases, and the institution of permanent employment are ideas which
carry the potential for inspiring reform in American labor relations. Were
American labor relations to import the Japanese practice of paying up to
one-third or so of compensation in the form of a bonus, American
society would acquire the potential for reaping the many benefits of that
system--the increased identification between workers and their enterpris-
es, engendering in a variety of ways, enhanced productivity and
responsiveness to changes in market conditions, thus maintaining scale
economies, sustaining profits, employment, and progress down learning
curves. The direction indicated by the Japanese model is congruent with
proposals previously urged by American scholars interested in finding
293. Indeed, for the purposes of enhancing the competitive response of a firm to changing
conditions in the marketplace, the effect of transforming compensation from an hourly wage base
to a the bonus system is pro tanto similar to making labor a fixed cost, in that variable cost would
then be computed without regard to labor. Labor, however, to the extent that it was compensated
under a bonus format, would be neither a fixed nor variable cost in conventional terms, but more
of a claim on profits.
294. See 1996 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 26, at 436 tbl.681.
295. See REES, supra note 57, at 20-22.
296. See id. at 187-88.
297. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
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ways to foster converging perspectives by labor unions and employers on
workplace issues.298
Because conversion to a bonus system can be done on a company-
by-company basis, this route to reform is compatible with the existing
state of private-sector industry in the United States, where unions
constitute only a modest proportion of the labor force. Yet the bonus
system surprisingly produces institutional incentives similar to those of
Mancur Olson's encompassing organizations. Encompassing organiza-
tions develop institutional goals which approximate the aggregate public
welfare because their extensive membership replicates the interests of the
larger society. A labor union whose members receive a major part of
their compensation in the form of bonuses or profit sharing develops an
institutional incentive to foster behavior consistent with the profit-making
goals of the employing enterprise and hence consistent with national
welfare."' Indeed, the incentive of the union and its members is to
enhance the enterprise's profits. Thus, the profit-sharing arrangement
transforms the traditional American adversary relationship between
employer and employee into one of cooperation, since now both sides
seek the same goal.
Again, the Japanese practice of an economy-wide approach to
hourly-wage changes might be desirable, especially in conjunction with
an encouragement of collective bargaining over the ways that employees
would share in company profits. First, annual increases for all industries
equal to the average aggregate productivity increases of all industries
would focus the attention of workers, employers, and society upon
productivity--the engine upon which all elements of society rely for their
economic well-being. Second, since productivity always increases over
the long run, there is little danger of racheting up hourly wage levels to
unsustainably high levels. Third, an economy-wide approach to hourly
wages would facilitate the transformation of expectations to a bonus
system as the source for the extraordinary compensation likely to
accompany extraordinary profits.
The cooperative attitude of Japanese workers engendered by the
bonus system receives additional support from the Japanese institution of
permanent employment. Since workers are not fearful of losing their
298. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 30, at 248 (suggesting that both the voice and
responsibility of unions for the enterprise must be increased for unions to be more effective in the
U.S.); Estreicher, supra note 54, at 40-43 (suggesting various ways labor laws should be amended
in order to improve relationships between employers and unions).
299. See discussion supra Part IV.A.3.
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jobs, they are not inhibited from suggesting ways to produce more with
less labor input. The two institutional factors play together: permanent
employment provides workers the security which they need to provide
efficiency-enhancing input to their employers, while the bonus system
provides them with the economic incentive to do so. Conversely, the
bonus system introduces sufficient flexibility into worker compensation
as to enable the enterprise to maintain its employment base in the face
of a falling demand.
American employers might be reluctant to support a system of
permanent employment analogous to the Japanese practice, because they
have become accustomed to the ease and flexibility which the practice
of layoffs provides for the control of labor costs. Yet flexible compensa-
tion, such as a bonus system, provides an alternative route to the control
of labor costs and one which makes it easier for an enterprise to provide
enhanced employment security. Indeed, layoffs are a less desirable
method for controlling labor costs than is an alternative flexible
compensation method since the latter better preserves (and fosters the
growth of) the enterprise's human capital, its scale economies, and its
progress on the industry's learning curve.
Americans do not always advert to the fact that the Japanese system
of "permanent" employment is not radically different from American
employment practices. The seniority system (which is almost universally
observed in the United States) effectively provides security against
layoffs to the large core of workers in any enterprise who have been
employed for the longest period. It would not be a major step to
formalize the "permanent" employment aspect of current U.S. practice by
identifying a core of workers in each enterprise as permanently
employed, while treating the remaining body of the most recently hired
workers as "temporary" or "probationary" employees who are waiting for
openings in the body of permanent employees. Such a step would
reconceptualize the way we in the United States think about the
workforce into a format resembling the Japanese model. Yet to a large
extent it would merely recognize the high degree of employment security
presently possessed by the core of the workforce of many enterprises,
while similarly recognizing the lack of security possessed by the band of
workers most recently hired.
This kind of reconceptualization of the workforce of enterprises into
"permanent" and "temporary" employees has the potential advantage of
reshaping workplace incentives when it is combined with other reforms.
To the extent that employees whose jobs are in fact permanent recognize
that fact and act accordingly, they will--like their Japanese counter-
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parts-lose their inhibitions about affirmatively cooperating with their
employers to enhance efficiency. Combined with a bonus or other profit-
sharing system, the permanent employees would possess incentives for
efficiency-enhancing cooperation, including accepting flexibility of job
descriptions and the elimination of most work rules. Finally, such a
change would enable the seniority system to lose its significance. When
the workplace division was formalized into categories of permanent and
temporary workers, with all permanent workers treated alike, interest
conflicts within the class of permanent workers would vanish, and within
that class identification with the overall welfare of the enterprise would
be further strengthened.
With these reforms--the introduction of a bonus or other profit-
sharing system and the adoption of a form of "permanent" employment
from the Japanese model--American labor relations would move strongly
in a cooperative direction. Since the goals of both workers and manage-
ment would be directed towards greater efficiency, a broadening of
worker participation in workplace governance along German lines would
become practicable. At the plant level, workers' representatives might
consult with plant management through works councils, while a labor
representative might participate in the deliberations of the company
board.
We know that the public interest is furthered when enterprises
pursue profit-maximizing goals. Indeed, these private maximizing goals
underlie the action of the market in allocating resources efficiently. When
the goals of workers and their unions are transformed into maximizing
a profit base from which both employers and workers draw their returns,
labor's goals become coincident with those of society. Indeed, this profit-
sharing format produces the same coincidence between the goals of labor
and the public welfare which theory allocates to "encompassing" labor
unions. Yet the profit-sharing route to this goal is more direct and thus
less likely to be undermined by inter-union rivalries or by the internal
politics of a massive encompassing union.
This profit-sharing approach to capital/labor cooperation is a form
of integrating labor into the productive enterprise. It changes the focus
from labor as a purchased commodity to labor as a participant. Ronald
Coase has pointed out that a business firm integrates when integration is
more profitable than outsourcing."' And Oliver Williamson points out
that an array of transaction costs exacerbated by recurring technological
300. See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMWCA N.S. 386, 396-97 (1937).
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changes and uncertainties heightens the benefits of integration over
contracting when input suppliers deal with output producers in a bilateral
monopoly situation.3"' Their insights are properly brought to bear on
the relations between employers and organized labor. A movement
towards negotiating increased amounts of compensation in the form of
flexible arrangements such as profit sharing and bonuses and lesser
amounts in the form of rigid hourly wage rates would transform the la-
bor/management relation pro tanto into one of integrated participants in
a common venture. Such a venture would resolve bilateral monopoly
negotiations to the benefit of both parties while simultaneously eliminat-
ing the double-monopoly produced under the present system in concen-
trated industries. It would also enhance the ability of the enterprise to
respond to market challenges. Insofar as it is beneficial to both parties to
follow that route, they will do so, circumstances permitting. What
impedes the labor side from pursuing such a strategy in the U.S. context
is the economic conflict of interest engendered by the seniority system
as it works in its current context, the more secure workers resisting
changes which would maximize the overall economic return to labor.
Labor relations in the United States are thus impeded by present
institutional arrangements from reaching more socially optimal arrange-
ments. Modest revision of U.S. labor laws would benefit not only
society, but workers themselves. This is not the place to propose a
detailed revision of those laws. But the direction of reform is clear
enough. Labor unions and their employing companies should be
encouraged or required to bargain for a major portion (approximately
one-third) of compensation in a form which depends upon the success of
the company. And the employment relation should probably be
refashioned to facilitate the formal recognition of a "permanent"
employment relationship for the core of workers which in most
enterprises is in fact permanently employed. Finally, some form of
annual hourly wage adjustment reflecting economy-wide changes in
productivity should probably be encouraged or required. These are the
routes taken in Japan. And they are routes which appear likely to produce
the results which an encompassing organization produces in theory but
often fails to produce in practice.




In this Article the Author has presented the main outlines of a
reformed labor law policy, a new policy which would be more fully
compatible with today's global marketplace, and which would serve to
enhance the well being of the entire workforce. The Author has not
attempted here to provide an answer to every difficulty which may arise
under the outline presented.
Labor law reform in the United States-especially reform which is
compatible with global competition-is urgently needed. Yet the
literature, with few exceptions, has not addressed the problem festering
beneath the surface of existing laws and practices: how to minimize
restraints in the product markets while maximizing labor's return, and
how to do both in a world of intense international competition. In this
Article, the Author has responded to this need, outlining broadly the
direction in which reform should proceed.
Those who disagree with this policy prescription will have their own
proposals. If the Author's presentation serves to stimulate others to offer
alternative prescriptions for labor law reform, this Article will have
served a need.
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